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The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is a voluntary investor-led initiative, backed by 
the United Nations. Together, the six principles are meant to provide a ‘best practice’ code of 
conduct for institutional investors seeking to adopt responsible investment practices with a 
secondary goal of contributing to improved corporate performance on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues. Launched in 2006, the PRI has grown to be the single largest global 
investor initiative with over 700 signatory financial institutions representing assets under 
management in excess of $US20 trillion.  
Contributing to the broader literature on plausible explanations for why firms participate in 
voluntary initiatives, the thesis is primarily concerned with the question of what has motivated 
institutional investors to create and publicly commit to the PRI. A review of the broader trends 
behind the growth of responsible investment and the emergence of the PRI indicates the 
dominant utilitarian, cost-benefit logic is not wholly persuasive in understanding investor 
motivations. The research findings indicate that decisions to integrate ESG issues and publicly 
commit to adopting the PRI should be primarily viewed as a response to formal pressures by 
external stakeholders and actors in an investor’s institutional environment. Regulatory and 
stakeholder influences in the form of NGO advocacy campaigns have established normative 
standards directed towards the conduct of investors. As public opinion has shifted to put greater 
emphasis on sustainable development, the image and reputation of a pension scheme in relation 
to these trends have come under increasing scrutiny such that being perceived as a ‘responsible’ 
investor – sometimes even in the absence of a direct market rationale – has become a central 
driver behind the growth of responsible investment. The decision to adopt the PRI and establish 
beyond-compliance commitments to integrate ESG issues into investment decision-making 
should principally be seen as embedded in broader reputational risk management strategies. 
These findings support complex market rationalism explanations for firm participation in 
voluntary initiatives which suggest that firms commit to such principles or codes of conduct as a 
means of assuring stakeholders that their concerns are being internalized into corporate practices. 
A secondary focus of the thesis is to examine signatory implementation to-date, assessing the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the voluntary measure for the promotion of more socially-
responsible and environmentally-sustainable investments. While substantial progress has been 
shown by a small group of PRI signatories, it remains unclear whether the PRI has generated 
significant improvement across the broader signatory base. The PRI suffers from several 
weaknesses commonly identified in the literature on voluntary initiatives. First, a lack of 
accountability measures limits incentives for investors to go beyond business-as-usual. Second, 
less stringent voluntary standards like the PRI are likely to suffer from adverse selection and free 
riding, therefore threatening the credibility of the initiative’s reputation over the longer-term. 
Ironically, weaknesses in the institutional design of the PRI may undermine the very reputational 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The relevance of financial institutions to sustainable development 
Scholars and policy-makers are increasingly recognising that the financial services sector has a 
significant bearing on sustainable development. Importantly, this increased focus is not primarily 
because of the sector’s own, direct environmental impact, but rather, due to the indirect effects of 
its loans to and investments that finance broader economic activity. Since the 1970s, companies 
have increasingly relied upon capital markets as sources for external financing, rather than 
internal funds generated from their operations. This has been referred to by some as the era of 
‘finance capitalism’ (Clark and Hebb 2005) characterized by the massive growth of institutional 
investment, increased need for external financing sources and corporate managers’ sensitivity to 
company stock prices. The growing influence of the financial sector also arises from the support 
it provides business through insurance and financial advisory services.  
A broad literature has noted the problematic relationship between financial markets and 
sustainable development, focusing on the tendency of financial institutions to pursue short-term 
strategies that fail to account for – and perpetuate - negative externalities such as environmental 
damage and other market failures (Schmidheiny et al. 1996; Mayer 2002; Haigh and Hazelton 
2004; UNEP FI AMWG 2007; Richardson 2007; Aspen Institute 2009). As a result of these 
issues, financial institutions are viewed as generally having little concern for long-term issues or 
the environmental impact of investments.  
The short-termism argument rests on capital markets being too near-sighted in the way in which 
they evaluate company performance. As many sustainable development issues are inherently 
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long-term, short-termism results in the systematic erosion of incentives for company directors to 
initiate performance improvements which may not have immediate, discernable impacts (The 
Aspen Institute 2009). One identified cause of short-termism is the reality that investment 
managers are evaluated by their clients – for example, pension funds – based on short-term 
performance criteria (Haigh and Hazelton 2004). Fund managers with a primary focus on short-
term trading gains have little reason to consider longer-term corporate performance or the 
production of negative externalities. Financial institutions are therefore less likely to exercise a 
positive role in promoting and improving corporate governance policies that result in more 
sustainable corporate behaviour over the longer-term. The problem has been acknowledged by 
the CEO of one of the U.K.’s largest institutional investors:  
There appear to be resisters to responsible investing which relate to deeply rooted 
characteristics of the investment decision-making system, including the mandates 
that pension funds and their investment consultants set; the systems for measuring 
and rewarding performance (which focus on peer comparison and beating 
benchmarks rather than on fulfilling the long-term liabilities of pension funds); and 
the competencies of service providers (e.g. sell-side analysts). The effect of this 
resulting short-termism is that less attention is paid to responsible investment 
matters than is appropriate – these issues are too long term in nature to affect the 
day-to-day behaviour of fund managers (USS 2003). 
As a result of the failure to internalize companies’ environmental and social costs on company 
balance sheets, capital markets do not incorporate these issues. This generates an environment 
where it would be irrational for investors to incorporate companies’ full social and 
environmental costs as they are not viewed as affecting profitability or earnings per share over 
the traditional investment time horizon. Furthermore, there is evidence that financial markets do 
not allocate capital efficiently and that unsustainable bubbles caused by speculation and 
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inattention to environmental or social issues result in broad inefficiencies and the misallocation 
of capital. Such capital flows may trigger undesirable social and environmental effects arising 
from specific company and project investment choices (Richardson 2005). 
Until recently, discussions on the impact of finance on sustainable development have centered on 
the area of public development finance (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). In particular, the roles of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment have been explored as 
tools for funding international sustainable development efforts. Additionally, the focus has 
tended towards the role of multilateral development bank (MDB) lending from the World Bank 
and its sister organisations. In addition to the conditions these organisations attach to project-
based development loads, MDBs have attracted attention for their influence on the general 
economic policy of borrower countries through conditional structural adjustment and sector 
policy loans. Since the 1980s, international economic institutions have experienced increasing 
public pressure to reform their financial policies to address environmental and social risks. In 
contrast to private financial flows of capital, public development has attracted greater scrutiny 
given the higher profile of many projects including China’s three gorges dam project (Hadfield-
Hill 2007). This has resulted in some reforms at the operational level, including mandatory 
environmental assessments of some project financing proposals (IISD 2009). 
While the reform of intergovernmental development finance is significant, alone, greening public 
development finance is not enough. The private capital markets must also be reformed to address 
issues such as climate change, as some have concluded private sector investors will be 
responsible for financing more than 85 percent of the global transition to a low carbon economy 
(Ceres 2010). Combined, private financial institutions hold greater capital resources and 
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influence over capital allocation than governments, and their hold over capital funds is increasing 
in the context of the globalisation of financial markets (Harmes 1998). 
 ‘The building blocks of the world’s capital markets’ 
Of particular significance are public and private pension funds along with other institutional 
investors (mutual funds and insurance companies) that are central actors in private capital 
markets, accounting for up to 35 percent of total global investment (Watson Wyatt 2009). In 
many countries, institutional investors have become the predominant owners of equity capital in 
publicly listed companies and their influence and size worldwide is forecasted to continue 
growing, chiefly due to the privatisation and development of pension fund systems (Gillan and 
Starks 2003).  
Institutional investors derive their power as central actors in capital markets from their ability to 
represent large numbers of beneficiaries combined with their day-to-day control of investment 
decision-making. The principal goal of institutional investors is to provide benefits for members 
and customers through prudent long-term investment returns. The object of their attention is the 
firm in which they invest, in order to generate and secure returns which enable the scheme to 
fulfill its obligations to legal beneficiaries.  
Pension funds and other institutional investors aggregate shareholders’ interest within a broadly 
dispersed capitalist system, reversing a pattern of widely held ownership and declining 
shareholder power (Clark 2000; Hawley and Williams 2000; Monks 2001).  For example, in the 
U.S., institutional investment has grown from 6.1 percent of aggregate ownership of equities in 
1950 to approximately 66.3 percent in 2006. The Conference Board reports that total U.S. 
institutional investor assets have risen tenfold from $US2.7 trillion in 1950 to $US27.1 trillion in 
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2006. At the same time, institutional equity holdings have increased from 37.2 percent in 1980 
($US571.6 billion) to 69 percent of the largest 100 U.S. corporations in 2006 ($US12.9 trillion). 
In 2007, institutions owned 76.4 percent of the largest 1000 U.S. corporations, up from 61.4 
percent in 2000 and 46.6 percent in 1987 (The Conference Board 2007).  
Similar shifts in equity ownership have occurred in the United Kingdom (U.K.). The Myners 
Report notes that individual share ownership has declined from over 50 percent of the market in 
the early 1960s to approximately 15 percent in 1999. At the same time, institutional ownership 
has risen from 30 percent to over 50 percent (Myners 2001: 27). Concentrated ownership 
patterns are also increasingly visible in institutional investor holdings of foreign equities. In 
2006, 78 percent of foreign equities were held by investors from nine countries (U.S., U.K., 
Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and France) with U.S. and 
U.K. institutions alone accounting for 42 percent of the total (The Conference Board 2007).  
In addition to their ability to re-aggregate ownership patterns and their growing assets, pension 
funds increase their leverage within the financial system through a newfound willingness for 
activism on corporate governance as a means of protecting and enhancing shareholder value both 
individually and in coalition with others (Hebb 2008). Institutional investors have influence 
through the shares they own in particular companies, which give them the opportunity to bring 
fourth shareholder resolutions, and, when they own a large enough block of shares or act 
collectively, give them real voting power and management clout. Secondly, institutional 
investors have influence through the shares they do not own, but over which they exert influence 
by establishing standards or screens when considering future purchases, forcing companies that 
want their shares to be widely purchased to come into line with those standards (Haufler 2005).  
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With such large pools of capital under management and a necessity to diversify (Clark and Hebb 
2005), institutional investors have come to be significant owners in that they own entire cross-
sections of economies (Hawley and Williams 2000; 2005). As risk-averse value investors, 
institutional investors are required to hold securities in their portfolios for longer periods of time 
in order to realize gains in shareholder wealth (Clark and Hebb 2005). The long-term nature of 
these decisions requires investors have greater information about the underlying fundamentals of 
the firms in which they invest. The enormous size of pension fund capital pools furthermore 
deny them the ability to exit from firms in which they are invested in even in the face of 
dissatisfaction with firm performance (Clark and Hebb 2005).  
In the past, the costs associated with corporate engagement, when measured against the possible 
gain in share value, meant that few individual investors were willing to take on company 
management. Because today’s pension funds and institutional investors hold such large stakes in 
individual firms, they are able to either bear these costs alone or, more often, act in coalition with 
other investors (Amalric 2006). Pension funds have increasingly resorted to voice – rather than 
exit (divestment) - in order to influence investee firms and prevent or avoid value destruction and 
ensure the ability to meet long-term liabilities (Clark 2005:150). This has resulted in two 
important developments: corporate engagement has become a more potent force than in the past 
(O’Rourke 2003; Mayer 2002) and pension funds and other institutional investors have 
increasingly used their shareowner rights to exert control over firm-level decision-making via 
concerns with corporate governance issues (Clark 2004: 148).  
On this latter point, commentators have emphasized the increasing - though fragmented – 
intersection of traditional corporate governance issues with broader stakeholder concerns, 
including environmental and social issues  that have been historically viewed as ‘non-financial’ 
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or outside the investment analysis and decision-making process. Within institutional investment, 
these developments have been most closely associated with the emergence of ‘responsible 
investment.’ 
What is responsible investment? 
‘Responsible Investment’ describes an investment process that incorporates an active 
consideration of environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) factors within 
investment decision making and ownership practices (Mercer Investment Consulting 2009). 
Traditional ethical or Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) refers to an approach towards 
investment that seeks to achieve a balance between environmental or social and risk/return 
objectives. These two sets of objectives are seen, at least to some extent, as being in conflict, and 
SRI seeks to strike an acceptable compromise between them. (UNEP FI AMWG 2007). 
Responsible investment, on the other hand, is based on the belief that ESG factors can have a 
material impact on the operations of companies and on investment markets and that, therefore, 
analysis of these factors can enhance investment outcomes from a risk/return perspective. (See 
figure 1 below). SRI and responsible investment share some of the same techniques and often 
focus on the same issues. Also, the attention to ESG issues encouraged by responsible 
investment can often result in progress on social or environmental dimensions. Nevertheless, 
responsible and SRI are based on significantly different underlying philosophies. Further, the 
emphasis on the tools employed by each differs – whereas SRI tends to focus on screening and 
SRI-themed products, responsible investment will potentially use these options and pursue and 




Figure 1 – Positioning RI alongside traditional SRI and ethical investment approaches 
 
Another important distinction can be made regarding the primary actors and methods used in 
ethical or SRI investing and responsible investment. In the case of traditional ethical/SRI, 
church-based and ethical-branded mutual funds for individual ‘retail’ investors were the primary 
actors. However, in responsible investment, it is primarily institutional investors who are the 
main actors, citing arguments that environmental, social and corporate governance factors can be 
financially material and should therefore be embedded within the investment process to enhance 
long-term value creation. This has resulted in institutional investors expanding the boundaries of 
what is discussed with investee companies to include corporate ESG performance and 
increasingly utilizing active ownership tools, such as proxy voting, corporate dialogue and 
collaborative engagement with other investors under the pretext of protecting and enhancing 
shareholder value (O’Rourke 2003; Sparkes and Cowton 2004).  
Environmental reforms targeting the financial sector 
Given the potential of the financial services sector to act as a potentially powerful lever for the 
promotion of sustainable development, their reform to promote greater sensitivity to the 
environment may offer a way to reduce the incidence of unsustainable development. While 
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financiers have the means to influence these developments, there has been little policy 
intervention with only a few tentative environmental reforms targeting the financial sector at the 
state level. State regulations which focus on lender liability for environmental damage are 
present in only a few jurisdictions. Under the EU Directive on Environmental Liability (2004) 
and in the U.S. under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, banks can be held directly responsible for environmental pollution of clients (Richardson 
2007; Peeters 2003: 211). Economic incentives have also been established in the case of the 
Netherlands Green Investment Directive (1995) which provides tax concessions for 
environmentally-focused investment funds (Scholtens 2006). 
As will be discussed in the fourth chapter, various states have also relied on informational policy 
instruments in the form of legislation requiring pension funds to disclose their policies on 
environmental, social and ethical considerations. Pension fund regulatory authorities in most 
OECD countries, however, have taken a relatively passive stance towards encouraging the 
consideration of ESG issues in investment decision-making. At present, where in existence, the 
approach taken by regulatory authorities relies largely on disclosure requirements that require 
pension funds to inform their clients of the extent to which ESG or ethical factors are 
incorporated into the fund’s investment strategy.  
In the absence of deeper regulatory intervention, reforms have tended to rely on financial 
institutions voluntarily committing to more environmentally-sustainable finance. While 
definitions of this phenomenon vary considerably, one general definition of voluntary 
environmental governance measures is that they are “commitments made in the absence of 
express legal requirements, commitments which prescribe norms to regulate behaviour in 
relation to their interaction with the environment” (Labatt and Maclaren 1998).  Complementing 
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these initiatives is a growing literature on corporate citizenship and business ethics that challenge 
the dominant economic conception of companies and promotes “the business case” for CSR 
(Schmidheiny and Watts 2002). The voluntary approach, often described as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) or business self-regulation is thriving in many countries and on a multitude 
of issue areas and industries (Utting and Clapp 2008).  
The Principles for Responsible Investment  
Categorized as a principles-based code of conduct, the Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) represents the latest manifestation of a voluntary initiative focused on institutional 
investors. Launched in 2006, the PRI is an investor-led initiative, backed by the United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative and United Nations Global Compact that consists of 
a set of six voluntary and aspirational principles which institutional investors (asset owners such 
as pension funds and investment managers) are invited to publicly commit to.  
1. We will incorporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues into 
investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices. 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment 
industry. 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.  
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Discussed in the following chapter, the PRI emerged as an attempt to address a governance gap 
by providing institutional investors with a framework for incorporating environmental, social and 
governance issues into their investment decision-making and ownership practices.  
Each of the Principles is accompanied by a list of possible actions (35 in total) meant to provide 
‘best practice guidance’ in implementing each principle. As an example, possible actions for 
investors to be responsible investors via active ownership include ‘exercising voting rights or 
monitoring compliance with a voting policy (if outsourced); filing shareholder resolutions 
consistent with long-term ESG considerations; engaging with companies on ESG issues and 
participating in collaborative engagement initiatives.  
Through institutional investor commitment to, and implementation of the Principles, the PRI sees 
several benefits: 
While these Principles are designed to enhance the delivery of long-term returns to 
beneficiaries, their implementation will also focus greater attention on ESG issues 
throughout the investment and corporate sectors. New research and better metrics will be 
developed to support investors as they become increasingly active owners. Encouraged to 
adopt a more systematic approach to managing ESG issues, corporate management will 
take more interest in these extra-financial drivers of risk and reward, which will come to 
define corporate profitability in the medium and longer term. The PRI will also stimulate 
increased active ownership on ESG issues by investors. In this way, the Principles for 
Responsible Investment will contribute to improved corporate performance on 
environmental, social and governance issues (PRI 2007). 
 
From a founding signatory base of 20 institutional investors at the launch of the PRI in 2006, as 
of March 2010, 714 financial institutions from 44 countries (consisting of public and private 
pension funds, mainstream investment managers and professional service providers) have 
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publicly committed to the PRI. In total, signatories to the PRI represent assets under management 
in excess of $US 20 trillion (see figure 2).  
 Figure 2 – Growth in PRI signatories and AUM since launch 
While the dramatic growth of the PRI - has received ample coverage in the mainstream financial 
press, there is a notable gap within the academic literature with regards to analyzing the 
emergence of the PRI and investor motivations to adopt the principles. Furthermore, few studies 
have sought to measure the potential effectiveness of the voluntary initiative in inducing 







Statement of the research question 
To date, very few studies have examined the emergence and potential effectiveness of the PRI 
and its efforts within institutional investment to ‘mainstream’ and institutionalize the 
incorporation of ESG issues in investment decision-making and ownership practices. Scholars 
have tended to focus on the broad environmental implications of voluntary environmental 
programs within specific financial sectors including insurance (Paterson 2001) and project-
finance in the case of the Equator Principles (Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). Institutional 
investing has also been the focus of a number of studies (Harmes 1998; Hebb 2008; Kolk, Levy 
and Pinske 2008, Jagers and Stripple 2003) which address the potential influence of institutional 
investors on investee behaviour and the role of institutional investors in institutionalizing the 
norm of corporate disclosure of carbon emissions (Pattberg and Stripple 2007; Kolk 2008). 
Studies have also discussed the involvement of institutional investors in networks alongside 
NGOs which seek to leverage the collective power of investors to promote improved disclosure 
of corporate governance practices on the business risks and opportunities posed by climate 
change (O’Rourke 2004).  
In light of the gap in the academic literature, the thesis will analyze the emergence and 
governance potential of the Principles for Responsible Investment. Two research questions guide 
this endeavour: 
1. What has motivated institutional investors to create and publicly commit to the PRI - a 
voluntary code of conduct that addresses the environmental, social and governance 
aspects of their investments?  
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2. In assessing signatory implementation to-date, what observations and conclusions can be 
made about the adequacy of this voluntary measure for the promotion of more socially-
responsible and environmentally-sustainable investments? 
The dearth of literature regarding the growth of responsible investment among institutional 
investors is at least remarkable given the substantial growth of the PRI since its inception, having 
grown to be the largest voluntary initiative targeting financial institutions in terms of numbers of 
signatory financial institutions and assets under management represented. By analyzing investor 
motivations to adopt the PRI and publicly commit to integrating environmental, social and 
governance issues, this thesis seeks to contribute to the broader discussion of plausible 
explanations for why firms decide to adopt voluntary codes of conduct and how strategic 
motivations to participate influence the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives.  
Methodology  
The desired outcome of the research is the identification of the strategic motivations 
underpinning institutional investor decisions to publicly commit to the Principles for Responsible 
Investment. The research is exploratory and descriptive in nature given the gap in the literature 
on the growth of responsible investment practices among institutional investors in general, and 
the absence of scholarship to date on the Principles for Responsible Investment specifically. As a 
result of the nature of the research undertaken, a case study research method was adopted as a 
suitable approach (Yin 1984) for assessing the application of existing analytical frameworks to 
the case of the PRI. To assist in targeting and formulating the research questions, a literature 
review was conduct to establish what research has been previously conducted on the topic. As 
the topic has primarily been addressed in both business/management schools and the social 
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sciences (comparative political economy in particular), there was a need to synthesize the 
literatures with a focus on firm adoption of CSR commitments.  
A detailed review of the literature on firm participation in voluntary initiatives identified both 
primary and secondary documents as significant data sources.  Primary and secondary 
documents examined included published reports (in both hard copy and via internet) by internal 
and external stakeholders with a particular focus on industry association publications, marketing 
documentation and responsible investment reports from institutional investors. Industry surveys 
and perception audits related to responsible investment were also analysed.  
While the above documentation provided for a rich understanding of responsible investment in 
general, limited data was available on the PRI specifically. The primary source of data for 
assessing the activities of PRI signatories was the PRI Reporting and Assessment survey. For the 
2009 Reporting and Assessment survey, the data has been aggregated from 276 individual 
responses (124 Asset owners, 152 Investment managers) and made available by download from 
the PRI website.1 The 2009 Reporting and Assessment survey is the third annual reporting 
process which communicates signatory performance against approximately 100 questions using 
predominantly qualitative indices. Interpretive and quantitative analysis of PRI signatory 
implementation was performed on publicly-available aggregate raw data available from the PRI 
website. As the data is produced in aggregate form, the nature of the data precluded more 
advanced quantitative techniques as discussed in Chapter 5.   
Additional insight was gathered as a result of the researcher’s unique experiences related to an 





February 2010. These experiences included informal conversations with Secretariat staff and PRI 
signatories as well as attendance at several industry events and conferences.  
Thesis overview 
In responding to the above research questions, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will 
provide an overview of voluntary initiatives and the financial sector before describing the formal 
processes leading to the emergence of the Principles for Responsible Investment initiative. 
Synthesizing the literature from both business schools and international relations on CSR and 
finance in particular, Chapter 3 will review a range of plausible explanations identified with 
regards to the various strategic motivations firms may have for participating in voluntary 
initiatives. In Chapter 4, the conceptual framework will then be applied to an empirical analysis 
of the factors driving the growth of responsible investment practices among institutional 
investors, responding to the primary research question of identifying the strategic motivations 
behind investors committing to the PRI and integrating environmental, social and governance 
issues. Chapter 5 will provide an analysis of implementation of the PRI among institutional 
investors drawing from the 2009 PRI Reporting and Assessment results, identifying how a 
variety of strategic motivations to adopt the PRI are illuminated in the varying degree of 
implementation and compliance demonstrated by signatories. In light of these findings, Chapter 
6 will consider the effectiveness of the PRI to date with regards to governance potential and 
ability to challenge and reform investor practices. 
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Chapter 2 – Voluntary initiatives and the financial sector: the emergence of the PRI 
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, attempts to reform the financial services sector vis-à-vis the 
incorporation of ESG issues into decision-making processes have tended towards a reliance on 
voluntary measures. The following chapter explores these developments in greater detail for the 
purpose of contextualizing the emergence of the Principles for Responsible Investment. 
Several voluntary initiatives specifically targeting actors within the financial services sector have 
arisen although each differs in its design and function. For analytical purposes, these voluntary 
initiatives can be categorized2 as: 1) principles and codes of conduct; 2) reporting and disclosure 
schemes; and 3) environmental management systems schemes, as described below. 
Principles and codes of conduct 
Commitments to codes of conduct or sets of principles are among the most widespread and 
widely adopted form of voluntary initiative (Greene 2002). Principles or codes of conduct may 
address a broad and general group of organisations, firms within a particular industry or 
geography, a supply chain or a more specific focus. Codes may originate from processes within 
individual firms or industry associations or may be multi-stakeholder, involving actors outside of 
industry including NGOs and governments.  
The contents and aims of voluntary codes or principles can vary greatly. The exact content of the 
codes may be general, leaving much room for interpretation or prescriptive in the sense of 
                                                            
2 See Auld, Bernstein and Cashore 2008 who identify seven categories of voluntary initiatives; other typologies 
include Clapp and Thistlewaite (forthcoming) who focus on the financial sector but include a fourth category of 
voluntary environmental markets in their broader discussions of voluntary climate change programs designed for the 
financial sector.   
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stimulating certain action or restrictive in discouraging or forbidding certain behaviour. We can 
also distinguish between those that are performance-based or process-oriented (Auld, Bernstein 
and Cashore 2008). Performance-based codes dictate substantive goals for the improvement of 
participant’s environmental performance while process-oriented codes concern the procedures by 
which businesses manage their interaction with the environment, without setting specific targets 
for environmental performance. They may include, for example, expectations that participants 
publicly report on their environmental activities (Greene 2002).  
Codes also differ in their regulatory function and policy scope. Some perform several regulatory 
functions such as rule making (target or standard setting), administration (reporting and 
monitoring) and enforcement (Auld, Bernstein and Cashore 2008). In terms of policy scope, 
some codes target specific environmental problems while others address the environment in the 
context of CSR or sustainability (Khanna and Brouhle 2008). Finally, codes differ with respect to 
their compliance mechanisms, a broad term referring to measures regarding implementation, 
monitoring, reporting, auditing, verification and enforceability (Prakash and Potoski 2006).  
UNEP Statement by Financial Institutions on the Environment and Sustainable Development 
Internationally, a catalyst for bringing environmental issues to the attention of global financial 
markets is the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) Financial Institutions 
Initiative (UNEP FI). UNEP has been working closely with organisations in the financial 
services sector since the beginning of the 1990s at developing environmental management 
strategies specific to the industry. These developments occurred within a broader trend of UN 
agencies working in partnership with the financial (including commercial banks, investment 
banks, venture capitalists, asset managers and multilateral development banks and agencies) and 
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other commercial sectors during the run-up to and completion of the 1992 Conference on 
Environment and Development (Earth Summit). The partnership has evolved from an informal 
dialogue about the nexus between economic development, environmental protection and 
sustainable development. Underlying all of the Initiative’s activities are the primary goals of 
promoting the integration of environmental considerations into all aspects of the financial 
sector’s operations and services, and secondly, the goal of fostering private sector investment in 
environmentally-sound technologies and services.  
Financial institutions are encouraged to participate by signing either the Banking or Insurance 
Statements and agreeing in principle to recommendations outlined in “Recommendations from 
the UNEP Finance Initiative Presented to the World Summit for Sustainable Development” 
(2002) UNEP FI Statements are aspirational, voluntary, non-binding declarations of intent with 
the clarification that becoming a signatory imposes no new legal liabilities upon the signatory. 
As well, signatories must pay an annual contribution fee and submit an environmental or 
corporate social responsibility report which details steps taken to advance commitments to the 
Statements. An additional aspect of the voluntary initiative is participation in several working 
groups on a range of themes including climate change and biodiversity. Such working groups 
emphasize providing a collaborative forum for financial institutions to discuss best practices and 
promote inter-firm learning. To date, 170 financial institutions from 44 countries have become 
signatories. 
London Principles of Sustainable Finance 
Launched at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the London 
Principles were promoted as an example of the Type II multiple stakeholder partnerships 
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involving both NGOs and business alongside public authorities. Eleven European companies and 
investment institutions have signed a set of seven principles intended to clarify how financial 
markets can encourage sustainable development. The London Principles, launched by the 
Corporation of London, commit signatories to provide greater access to financial products for the 
socially-excluded and to “use equity ownership to promote CSR.” The London Principles apply 
to all aspects of finance and not just value-based investments and banking niches. They are 
aspirational and seek to encourage continuous improvements in participant behaviour requiring 
signatories to report annually on their progress towards their implementation (Peeters 2003). 
Criticisms on the London Principles point to the fact that the seven principles are vague and that 
its efforts duplicate those of UNEP FI.  
Equator Principles 
The Equator Principles represent another example of a principle-setting exercise but one which 
focuses on the specific sector of project finance by providing an international voluntary code of 
environmental conduct for banks. Drafted in 2003 under the auspices of the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation, the Equator Principles provide a framework that commit 
signatory banks to develop individual policies, procedures and practices to ensure that projects 
are assessed and carried out according to specific social and environmental considerations 
(Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). The Equator Principles are not a self-contained set of 
principles but incorporate other sets of standards, particularly the IFC’s Safeguard Policies which 
address environmental assessment, natural habitat, pest management, forestry, safety of dams, 
indigenous peoples, child labour and international waterways. Although the Principles are 
‘adopted’ by interested banks, the bank’s borrowers, whether government or nongovernment, are 
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expected to adhere to them as long as the lender has put in place appropriate policies and 
procedures.  
While some financial institutions outside of the project-financing sector have embraced the 
Equator Principles, and others have extended the Principles to their non-project finance 
activities, the Principles do not provide a general framework for promoting environmentally 
sound financing across the whole financial services sector. Rather, the Principles are structured 
around decision-making in project finance. They are not intended for, and cannot easily be 
adapted to, for example, equity investments made by pension funds and mutual funds.  
Investor Network on Climate Risk Action Plan 
The Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), launched in 2003, is a project of Ceres, a US-
based NGO whose mission is ‘integrating sustainability into capital markets for the health of the 
plant and its people” (Ceres 2007). Ceres aims to accomplish this by encouraging disclosure of 
information concerning aspects of a firm’s environmental performance and decision-making 
processes in a manner consistent and comparable in form to what is used by investors for 
analysis of corporate financial performance. While the core of Ceres work has focused on 
leveraging a network of investors and environmental NGOs to address the above issues, the 
Investor Network on Climate Risk Action Plan aims at influencing the behaviour of investors 
directly with regards to the issue of climate change.  
As of 1 January 2010, investors with assets under management in excess of US$9.8 trillion have 
committed to implementing the Climate Risk Action Plan which outlines nine action points 
investors can take to evaluate and reduce the impact of their investments on climate change. The 
nine points address matters relating to how investments are managed including methods of 
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measuring climate change risk in their portfolio, engagement with portfolio companies on 
disclosure and mitigation efforts related to climate change risks and opportunities, and the 
supporting of policy which aim to improve corporate disclosure on climate risks and 
opportunities.   
Collevecchio Declaration 
Civil society views on the role of financial institutions have also coalesced in the formation of 
the Collevecchio Declaration (2003). Endorsed by more than 100 NGOs worldwide, the 
declaration argues that the appropriate goal of financial institutions should be “the advancement 
of environmental protection and social justice rather than solely the maximization of economic 
growth and/or financial return” (Waygood 2006). The declaration calls on financial institutions 
to make six commitments including a commitment to fully integrating environmental, social and 
economic factors, a commitment to ‘do no harm’ and a commitment to actively supporting 
public policy which facilitates full-cost accounting among others.  
Reporting and disclosure schemes 
A second category of voluntary initiatives focus on the provision of information related to a 
firm’s behaviour. In the past decade, corporate environmental reporting obligations have been 
revamped in many jurisdictions to encompass the financial services sector. Underlying the 
emphasis on transparency rather than prescriptive requirements is the hypothesis that global 
firms will face greater scrutiny and pressure to change their behaviour. It is also argued that such 
approaches can lead to learning among stakeholders about corporate practices, facilitating greater 
interaction between firms and broader stakeholders and a more accurate understanding of firm 
behaviour (Kolk, Levy and Pinske 2008).  
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While the prevalence of information approaches at the state level has been well documented 
(Gupta 2008), it also exists internationally in a voluntary format through such efforts of the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Levy, Brown and de Jong 2009). Established in 1997 by 
UNEP and Ceres, firms participating in the GRI voluntarily report the environmental and social 
impacts of their activities. The reporting rules are developed by stakeholder members of the GRI, 
with considerable discretion given to individual firms as they self-declare their level of 
adherence with the option of having this verified by a third-party. Since 2003, the GRI has 
developed a Financial Services Sector Supplement to encompass financiers (GRI 2009). The 
motivation for a financial services reporting framework within the GRI stems from recognition 
that the indirect environmental impacts associated with financial products and services are an 
area of interest to many stakeholders (GRI 2009). As financial institutions seek to manage these 
indirect impacts through the development of policies, systems and processes that help to enhance 
the quality of an institution’s risk management and product offerings, the GRI’s financial 
services performance indicators relate primarily to the systems used by financial institutions to 
incorporate environmental considerations into their business processes. 
Environmental management systems 
Environmental management systems (EMS) schemes establish standards about how firms are to 
manage internal approaches to environmental and social performance at the site level. They are 
intended to provide recognition for those firms who have established a program of environmental 
action designed to protect and to continuously improve their environmental performance 
(McKague and Cragg 2005). The most common requirements of an EMS are that an 
environmental policy be established within the organisation which is fully supported by senior 
management that outlines the policies of the company with regards to internal systems for the 
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management of a firm’s environmental impact and performance and stresses a commitment to 
continuous improvement.  
Of the two most prominent examples of EMS – Europe’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS)(1995) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001 (2004) – 
EMAS has provisions for the financial services sector which addresses investment banks, credit 
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and rating agencies (Richardson 2002). 
Consistent with other sector-based approaches in EMAS, the focus of financial service sector 
provisions are primarily on internal processes affecting site-level activities including the 
ecological footprint and energy efficiency of office buildings. Reference is also made that 
financial institutions reflect on systems to manage the indirect impacts of the activities (EMAS 
2010). 
EMS have been promoted for their ability to standardize firm practices across different sites and 
because they are viewed as promoting learning processes within the firm (Auld, Bernstein and 
Cashore 2008, 422). Internal auditing of systems is intended to lead to the identification of 
obsolete or inefficient practices that may produce dual benefits of improved efficiencies and 
environmental performance. In EMSs the focus is on systems rather than on behavioural on-the-
ground requirements. Although firms are audited for adherence to their EMSs, schemes do not 
establish or require any particular substantive change in performance, only a commitment to 
continual improvement from the company’s own specified targets.  
Voluntary measures specific to institutional investors 
The previous section has identified several voluntary initiatives which address the financial 
sector with regards to the consideration of the environment in their decision-making processes. 
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Reporting and disclosure schemes such as the GRI’s Financial Services Sector Supplement or 
EMAS, however, only address the direct environmental impact of the sector and not its 
investment activities. One observation regarding the breadth of approaches and focus to date is 
that the principles and codes of conduct have tended towards focusing on specific sectors or 
issue areas. As the longest serving voluntary initiative addressing the financial sector, UNEP FI 
has primarily focused on banking and insurance-related issues. The London Principles are 
broader but centred on those financial institutions with a strong operational presence in the City. 
The Equator Principles are structured around decision-making in project finance. They are not 
intended for, and cannot easily be adapted to, for example, investments made by pension funds 
or mutual funds. Finally, the INCR Action Plan does focus on institutional investors and the area 
of climate change but focuses on institutional investors primarily as a means of leveraging their 
market authority to demand corporate disclosure on climate change risks and opportunities. 
The emergence of the PRI 
In mid-2004, a number of United Nations agencies and initiatives launched projects which would 
pave the way for the emergence of the PRI. It also marked the latest attempt by the United 
Nations to form a partnership with the private sector under the auspices of a UN-backed 
voluntary code of conduct related to responsible investment. The United Nations was influential 
in the process leading to the creation of the PRI as it was involved in the organisation and 
production of research supporting the intellectual foundations of the initiative. In particular, the 
experiences of UNEP FI and the UN Global Compact as well as UN-sponsored publications 
would serve as influential in the later development of the PRI, in terms of the institutional design 
of the initiative and its intellectual foundations.  
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Since 1990, UNEP FI, a global partnership formed between UNEP and the financial sector has 
focused on ‘understanding the impacts of environmental and social consideration on financial 
performance.’ Though the initiative has historically centred on engaging commercial banking 
operations and the insurance industry, a series of working groups recognized increasing demand 
from the fund management industry and sought to exploit the ‘synergies’ between the focus of 
UNEP on sustainability and institutional investor’s long-term outlook (UNEP FI 2003; 2005). 
Likewise, in 2003, the UN Global Compact, itself launched in 2000, initiated a dialogue with the 
finance sector on the importance of corporate performance against its 10 principles for investors 
within the ‘Who Cares Wins’ initiative. At this time, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also 
indicated broader interest from the UN by convening the Institutional Investor Summit on 
Climate Risk alongside Ceres in December 2003 to discuss the financial implications of climate 
change. 
Altogether these projects and initiatives produced a number of publications capturing the current 
research on the financial materiality of ESG issues to investors and identifying possible actions 
for institutional investors. The publications concluded that ESG issues can be material to 
investors, especially over the long-term and investors who do not take these issues into account 
may be putting the interests of their beneficiaries at risk and/or overlooking opportunities to 
generate a return (UNEP FI AMWG 2005; 2007). These publications also commented on the 
availability of corporate ESG performance data concluding that there was a need for better 
quality and more comparable information if investors are to assess the significance of these 
issues in their investments (UNEP FI AMWG 2007). Finally, while voluntary initiatives such as 
the GRI were seen as providing standardized reporting frameworks, the overall level of 
disclosure remained limited where provided and not focused on investor needs (PRI 2007).  
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The publications concluded that institutional investors, particularly when acting collectively, can 
have significant influence as asset owners and clients of companies, fund managers, consultants 
and brokers and can use this influence to encourage improvements in ESG performance by 
companies. On this note, the reports argued that existing frameworks for collaboration among 
institutional investors (including Ceres’ INCR, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and 
regional networks such as the European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif)) were important in 
increasing the effectiveness of shareholder and policy-maker engagement, however, such 
platforms were generally found lacking or absent from most markets and on most issues (UNEP 
FI AMWG 2007). It was argued that such a framework and other efforts at capacity building 
were required in such a form that would allow the pooling of investor resources to reduce any 
free rider problems while providing guidance to investors on practical steps to integrating ESG 
issues into their investment decision-making processes. Both UNEP FI and UN Global Compact 
reports concluded that the integration of ESG issues was at very early stages but significant 
potential existed to leverage the existing experiences of both UN initiatives to form the basis of a 
global collaboration and capacity-building program around responsible investment.  
Based on these conclusions, in mid-2004, UNEP FI and UNGC committed to the creation of a 
UN-backed global initiative to promote responsible investment. These efforts were supported by 
a number of large public institutional investors including CalPERS, ABP, Canada Pension Plan, 
Fonds de reserve pour les retraites (France), the New York City Employees Retirement System 
and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund. Additionally, corporate pension schemes with 
strong union influences (BT Pension Scheme) and schemes representing university professors 
and healthcare employees (Universities Superannuation Scheme and PGGM (Netherlands) were 
supportive of the endeavour. The UN, it was announced, would partner with institutional 
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investors to work towards providing a common framework from which investors could develop 
their own policies and approaches to addressing ESG issues while at the same time providing a 
forum of exchange that would allow investors to work together on ESG issues, pool resources 
and share the costs of activities related to research and shareholder engagement (PRI 2007). As 
well, it was expressed that such a network/framework would internationalize the debate on RI by 
bringing developed, emerging and frontier market investors together to discuss these issues (PRI 
2007).  
The formal creation of the PRI, involving the drafting of the Principles and the initiative’s 
governance were undertaken over a one year period from early 2005. An advisory group 
consisting of leading thinkers and proponents of responsible investment (many of whom were 
active in the space through participation in issues-based initiatives such as INCR and regional 
social investment forums (Eurosif, UKSIF, SIF (US), ASRIA)) were active in developing the 
PRI.  It was determined that the initiative should be led by asset owners – primarily pension 
funds – given their position at the top of the investment chain. It was also a concern of the 
advisory group that if fund managers or service providers drove the process the initiative might 
focus on a commercial product or service-orientation rather than addressing systemic market 
failures. It was argued that such a focus would likely hinder efforts at engendering industry-wide 
reform (PRI 2007).  
Over nine days of in-person meetings, two groups were established to draft the text of the 
Principles. A 20 person investor group of mainly pension fund CIOs, CEOs and trustees were 
granted ultimate veto over the included text, and a 70 person group consisting of specialist and 
mainstream fund managers, NGOs active in the SRI space, academics, consultants and UN 
representatives. The stated goal of the drafting process was to develop a set of voluntary 
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principles which reflected best practice among leading institutional investors, which, if 
implemented broadly, would “contribute to improved financial returns and improved corporate 
performance on environmental, social and governance issues.” (PRI 2007) 
In the drafting process, the larger group of stakeholders first met to establish key points thought 
to be core to a set of principles for responsible investment. The group recommended that the 
Principles should commit investors to: the integration of ESG issues in investment analysis 
(which became Principle 1); active ownership - exercising ownership rights by voting shares and 
through shareholder engagement (Principle 2); transparency of investor and investee ESG 
performance (Principles 6 and 3); and, the need for institutional investors to send signals 
throughout the investment chain that ESG issues need to be incorporated (Principle 4).  
A number of additional points were discussed and recommended but ultimately rejected by the 
investor group. These included: measures against short-termism for institutional investors – 
which was touched on in Principle 4 but rejected as a principle on its own; assessment of the 
impact of the integration of ESG issues on investment performance, corporate behaviour, the 
environment and society – only its impact on investment performance was touched on in 
Principle 6; incorporation of international norms such as the UN GC, ILO core conventions, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – ultimately rejected except in so far as Principle 3 seeks 
disclosure from companies on performance against such; and, a commitment to responsiveness 
to beneficiary needs and preferences – ultimately rejected on grounds that calculating needs and 
preferences from such large and often disparate groups was not feasible.  
Many of the large pension funds and mainstream fund managers argued that the Principles would 
only be adopted by institutional investors if set firmly within the scope of fiduciary duty. It was 
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therefore argued that it was necessary that the Principles remain narrowly focused on the 
financial risk/return objectives of the fund. Agreement was reached, however, that within the 
paradigm of ‘exclusive (financial) interests of beneficiaries’ there was significant scope to 
integrate ESG issues into investment and active ownership processes. In qualifying the rationale 
for the integration of ESG issues by institutional investors, it was adopted that “ESG issues are 
potentially material to corporate performance and are not currently adequately incorporated into 
mainstream investments and ownership processes… doing so, should enhance risk-adjusted 
returns and deliver improved ‘ESG outcomes’ over the long term” (PRI 2007).  
Within these points, the investor group developed the key philosophies that would underpin the 
initiative. Investor commitment to the Principles would be framed in terms of fulfilling the 
primary responsibilities of the fund. Hence the text in the preamble notes that the Principles are 
to be applied in ways that are consistent with the investor’s fiduciary duties. It was agreed that 
the Principles should be aspirational rather than prescriptive and contain practical suggestions for 
implementation. Finally, the founding signatories in the investor group concluded that the 
Principles would represent a voluntary industry code of conduct but contain a commitment to 
reporting and implementation of the Principles should have a positive impact on investment 
performance and improved corporate environmental, social and governance performance.  
Implementing the PRI  
There are three main categories of signatory in the PRI: asset owners, investment managers and 
professional service partners. In signing, institutions are asked to provide a letter from the CEO 
or equivalent which includes a statement confirming the organisation’s approval of the Principles 
and a commitment to take part in the annual Reporting and Assessment process. Investors must 
31 
 
commit to implementing the Principles across the entire organisation as opposed to specific SRI 
funds or ESG practices. The objective is that the Principles be integrated across the investment 
functions of the entire organisation rather than being applicable within specific asset classes or 
product lines.  
The Principles are designed to be ‘voluntary and aspirational’ in that signing “represents a 
commitment to work towards implementation.” (PRI 2007)  The one mandatory requirement of 
being a signatory is that asset owner and investment manager signatories must complete the 
Reporting and Assessment survey annually. There are no compulsory fees associated with 
becoming a signatory to the PRI, however, a voluntary fee of US$10,000 is requested to assist 
the work of the Secretariat to support signatories and promote adoption of the Principles.  
Like the UN Global Compact and UNEP FI Statement for Financial Institutions, the PRI is 
explicit in stating that there are no legal or regulatory sanctions associated with the Principles. In 
terms of penalties for non-compliance, the Principles state that there “may be reputational risks 
associated with signing up and then failing to take any action at all, but the commitments are, for 
most signatories, a work in progress and a direction to head in rather than a prescriptive checklist 
with which to comply.” The constitution of the PRI has provisions for the removal of signatories 
if they do not participate in the annual Reporting and Assessment process for two years 
consecutively, or if the signatory “fails over successive years to progress towards the 
commitments outlined in the Principles.” The PRI are governed by a board which consists of 




The main accountability mechanism for the PRI is the annual Reporting & Assessment process. 
New signatories are given an initial one year grace period, after which they are required to self-
report their progress against approximately 100 indicators. Professional service providers are not 
required to complete the survey. The Reporting and Assessment process is meant to provide a 
broad range of benefits to stakeholders, including: a learning tool for signatories; an opportunity 
for the Secretariat to identify areas where further resources and guidance are needed; an off-the 
shelf reporting framework for investors to disclose their progress and benchmark themselves 
against peers and finally, a credibility measure to maintain the PRI brand (PRI 2007).  
There is no formal independent auditing of signatory responses, however, the Secretariat 
performs hour-long verification phone calls with a portion of signatories each year focused on 
signatory responses to a group of (scored) questions. The purpose of these calls is to consider the 
validity of signatory self-assessments and any assumptions made. While the Reporting and 
Assessment survey has been referenced as a measure to ensure integrity of the PRI, the emphasis 
to date has been less on the accountability aspect of the survey. The PRI’s soft-touch approach to 
monitoring and assuring (verifying) the performance of signatories has been – it is argued – to 
encourage the perception of a low barrier of entry and an emphasis on signatories going through 
a ‘learning-by-doing’ process (PRI 2008). While the Reporting and Assessment survey is 
referenced as a disclosure framework, signatories are not required to disclose or make their 
survey results publicly available, nor does the PRI state they must disclose activities to clients, 
beneficiaries or customers. 
Having established the context in which the PRI were created and elaborated upon what it 
demands of institutional investors, the aim of the thesis is to speculate on what has motivated 
investors to publicly commit to the principles en masse by exploring reasons why institutional 
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investors participate in the voluntary measure. The secondary focus is to examine the extent to 
which the PRI itself is conducive to promoting sustainability development by assessing signatory 
implementation to-date and analysing the institutional design of the initiative in light of the 
broader literature on the effectiveness of voluntary environmental governance measures. The 
following section reviews the literature on why private actors participate in voluntary 
environmental or CSR measures and what incentives financial institutions have for publicly 





Chapter 3 – Why do firms participate in voluntary initiatives? 
 
This chapter outlines a conceptual framework for understanding why firms participate in 
voluntary initiatives that establish a firm’s commitments and responsibilities in relation to 
environmental and social concerns above what is legally required of them. A review of the 
literature identifies three waves of explanations for explaining firm participation in voluntary 
initiatives. The first and most prevalent explanation is commonly associated with the ‘business 
case for CSR’ and has emerged primarily from the business school literature. This literature 
portrays participation in voluntary initiatives as primarily a strategic and functional response to 
pressures from internal and external stakeholders driven by a utilitarian, cost-benefit logic in 
firm-level decision-making. A second wave of explanations has emerged from the comparative 
political economy literature focusing on how national legal, social and political institutions shape 
the economy and firm decision-making. The institutional perspective suggests a firm’s decision 
to participate may be influenced by what is perceived as legitimate and acceptable by actors in 
the company’s relevant institutional environments, regardless of direct economic calculations.  
Finally, a more recent wave of explanations within the concept of complex market rationalism 
(Vogel 2008) suggest a more nuanced understanding due to the evolving and complex 
interactions between factors identified in the business school and international relations 
literature. This literature emphasizes how utilitarian/functionalist logic may be influenced by 
evolving norms in a firm’s institutional environment. The second half of the chapter reviews 
empirical research on voluntary initiatives in a variety of industries and sectors including project 
finance, forestry services and the chemical industry. These studies suggest participation can be 
grounded in a variety of strategic motivations that often do not fit neatly into either business 
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school or institutional theories, supporting complex market rationalism understandings of firm 
decision-making.    
Three waves of explanations 
Utilitarian, cost-benefit logic 
The prominent explanation for the growth of CSR and firm participation in voluntary measures 
related to environmental or social responsibilities is that an explicit market rationale exists which 
motivates a decision to participate. The broader emergence of CSR in its present form is said to 
be closely linked with the rapid pace of economic globalisation and resulting ‘governance gap.’ 
As argued by Ruggie (1998; 2003) and Strange (1998), the decline of the post-war system of 
‘embedded liberalism’ ushered in a new age characterized by the dramatic increase in the 
transnationalization of companies, foreign direct investments, global commodity chains and 
short-term capital flows. The diminished ability of governments to control and regulate 
companies that ensued, in particular as regards TNCs, led to greater insecurity and increased 
social costs, culminating in strong public protests against globalization in the mid to late 1990s. 
Of particular importance was the nature of these protests as they were aimed not primarily at 
governments but at business. Anti-globalization pressures and resulting demands for more 
socially and environmentally responsible globalization posed a new set of challenges to business, 
specifically for those with truly global operations. Participation in voluntary initiatives is 
portrayed as a strategic and functional response to pressures from internal and external 
stakeholders. Whereas in the past it sufficed for companies to follow national rules and 
regulation, the resulting governance gap forces them to go beyond legal requirements to be 
perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. Thus, for commercial reasons, corporations need 
36 
 
to establish a new form of legitimacy and a social license to operate (Sklair 2001) in which 
adoption of voluntary codes of conduct have become integral tools. The ‘business case for CSR’ 
emerges from the positive and negative incentives associated with stakeholder pressures (Haigh 
and Jones 2006; Gjolberg 2009). 
The fundamental logic underlying this view is that a firm’s decision to participate in voluntary 
initiatives and adopt CSR-related commitments emerges as a functional response to anti-
globalization and anti-corporate sentiments. Consequently, at the core of this hypothesis is 
corporate enlightened self-interest. Business CSR literature abounds with examples of ‘the 
business case for CSR’: improved risk management, reputational and brand image, access to 
niche markets, cost savings and improved access to capital, improved employee relations, etc. 
(SustainAbility and UNEP 2001; Zadek 2001; Vogel 2005). These explanations stress the 
strategic and economic benefits of adopting CSR practices and participating in voluntary, 
beyond-compliance measures. Acting more ‘responsibly’ by taking into account the concerns of 
sustainability and the firms’ wider stakeholders, therefore addressing the long-term financial 
interests of business is a dominant theme in much popular and business writings on CSR (Vogel 
2005). Such explanations suggest CSR and beyond-compliance corporate environmental 
practices makes ‘good business sense,’ (Schmidheiny 1992; Schmidheiny et al. 2002; 
Mazurkiewicz 2005) suggesting participation in a voluntary initiative can encourage internal 
processes of learning and adaptation while providing a means for firms and stakeholders to 
discuss issues and collaborate in resolving them. Moreover, it is suggested that collective sharing 
of experience can improve on best practices, allowing firms to acquire innovative pollution 
prevention technologies while fostering competition (Ruggie 2002). In this way, functional and 
utilitarian understandings suggest participation in voluntary initiatives can be more cost efficient 
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based on the idea that they permit firms to respond in their own manner, as each firm has 
different costs and capabilities for adoption, rather than in a way prescribed by command and 
control regulation.  
Institutional theory 
A second explanation and more normatively-driven logic for companies to engage in voluntary 
CSR initiatives are argued for in the comparative political economy literature. Institutional 
theory focuses on how national legal, social and political institutions have shaped and continue 
to shape the economy and in turn, corporate strategy. A number of studies adopting firm-centred 
approaches have argued that the institutional structure of a particular political-economic system 
provides firms with a specific set of comparative institutional advantages for specific types of 
activities. Importantly, despite the forces of globalization, this suggests the nation state still 
provides a crucial context for the development of corporate strategies. On the basis of 
comparative institutional advantages, these studies suggest differences in political-economic 
institutions will be reflected in differences in participation rates in CSR-type voluntary 
initiatives. The main mechanism proposed by several studies is that stronger institutions for the 
social embedding of the economy will result in higher participation rates and stronger CSR 
performance. Specifically, studies have focused on the corporatist arrangements and the general 
role of culture, norms and values and the question of political culture as impacting firm 
participation (Rivera 2004).  
One institution identified in the literature as relevant to firm participation is the presence of 
corporatist arrangements. Most important in this regard are the function of labour unions who 
can have an important advocacy role in promoting higher labour standards as well as other social 
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issues (Campbell 2007). Studies have indicated that strong traditions for cooperation between the 
social partners provide a platform that teaches, and to some extent also forces, business to pay 
due regard to broader societal concerns and to balance profit maximization against the interests 
of stakeholders. As a result of the generally closer involvement of business and labour as well as 
NGOs in policy-making in corporatist countries, it is proposed that business is held more 
accountable to the public. This can be expected to impose a longer-term perspective on business 
strategies related to society and the environment. Thus, strong corporatist traditions are expected 
to lead to a stronger embedding of companies, and consequently to stronger participation by 
firms in CSR in areas covered by corporatist relations.  
The more general question of political culture has been an integral part of the study of political 
economy and culture, norms and values are shown to be indispensible to the functioning of 
political-economic institutions. In studies of CSR practices and performance across a large 
number of countries, Rivera (2004) and Gjølberg (2009) concluded that a strong political culture, 
in terms of traditions for public participation, is a driver for improved CSR-performance in 
companies and have proposed that strong welfare state policies create direct and indirect forces 
that encourage companies to adhere to higher standards. Specifically, resourceful external 
stakeholders such as outspoken NGOs and a critical free press were shown to influence 
consumer awareness and public debate, providing companies with stronger incentives for 
engaging in voluntary environmental measures.    
To conclude, explanations found in comparative political economy literature emphasize the 
importance of public policies and political-economic institutions as pivotal normative 
expressions of national expectations of the role of business in society (Utting 2005; Rivera 2002; 
Vogel 2008; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 2003; Aguilera, Rupp and Williams., 2007). In 
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an institutional perspective, a firm’s willingness to participate and its CSR efforts may be 
influenced by what is perceived as legitimate and acceptable by actors in the company’s relevant 
institutional environments, regardless of direct economic calculations (Gjolberg 2009). 
Compared with the mainly utilitarian cost-benefit logic of the previous hypothesis, the 
institutionalist perspective opens for a more normatively-driven logic for companies participating 
in voluntary initiatives related to CSR. Thus, this perspective assumes that a strong social 
embeddedness renders firms normatively inclined towards increased CSR efforts and in turn, 
greater participation in voluntary initiatives.  
Complex market rationalism 
The most recent wave represents a sort of hybrid to the preceding explanations, suggesting the 
need to merge certain aspects of the functionalist/utilitarian and more normative, institutional 
arguments. Vogel (2008) argues for a more nuanced understanding of firm participation in 
voluntary initiatives, citing the complex interaction between strategic and functional responses 
and normative pressures. Along these themes, Vogel argues that the complex environment in 
which firms operate is constantly evolving – the result of historical macro-trends. As opposed to 
operating in a pure market environment, one explanation holds that business operates in an 
environment shared with other private actors including civil society, customers, shareholders and 
stakeholders. In this space, each actor brings with them particular role conceptions and 
normative standards directed towards the conduct of business operations (Vogel 2006). The 
argument is not that economic rationality is replaced by an intrinsic normative orientation. 
Rather, the concept of market rationality is changing its meaning under the conditions of a 
normatively-enriched environment. Complex market rationalism emphasizes the changing nature 
or costs and benefits which must be accounted for by business, differentiating between three 
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aspects that increasingly factor in business calculation of costs and benefits. This includes: the 
risks associated with stringent and costly public regulation; the risks associated with civil society 
action and consumer boycotts; and, the opportunities associated with making profits or 
producing goods for ecologically/socially-aware consumers. All of these considerations, Vogel 
argues, may cause individual firms or industries to create and/or comply with voluntary 
initiatives that demand beyond-compliance behaviour (Vogel 2008). Thus, the overlap between 
functional/strategic motivations and regulatory and/or stakeholder influence is considerable. 
Complex market rationalism explanations suggest that a firm’s decision to commit to a voluntary 
initiative should principally be seen as a response to internal and external pressures shaped by 
normative standards imposed by external institutions. In essence, there is a complex interaction 
between CSR, globalisation and domestic political-economic institutions. While there are purely 
functional reasons for firms to participate in voluntary initiatives (i.e. cost savings, reputation, 
differentiation), normative pressures from internal and external stakeholders can provide 
motivation for firms to establish commitments meant to provide or enhance their legitimacy and 
social license to operate, seeking to be perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. As Wright 
and Rwabizambuga (2006) conclude in their analysis of the Equator Principles (project finance), 
decisions to adopt voluntary measures that establish commitments and responsibilities related to 
‘responsible’ conduct can be principally seen as embedded in the broader risk management 
strategies of the firm. As the following section notes, detailed research on a variety of specific 
CSR voluntary initiatives reveals the difficulty in disaggregating functional/utilitarian and 
normative/institutional explanations. Rather, supporting Vogel (2008), empirical research 
indicates such a decision can be grounded in a variety of strategic motivations that are commonly 
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linked in complex ways to both functional, cost-benefit explanations and more normatively-
driven logic. 
Strategic motivations identified in empirical research 
Reputation and brand benefits 
The strategic motivation commonly identified in the literature on voluntary initiative is that firms 
adopt beyond-compliance measures as a means of protecting or enhancing their reputation by 
assuring stakeholders that it operates responsibly. Studies have indicated that adopting and 
committing to a voluntary code of conduct or other voluntary initiatives has become an important 
feature of a firm’s public relations and communications strategy in managing relationships with 
the firm’s primary stakeholders (Gibson 1999; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Wright and 
Rwabizambuga 2006; Auld, Bernstein and Cashore 2008).  
Recent empirical work suggests that companies’ environmental practices, including their 
decision to participate in voluntary programs particularly in high-impact sectors such as mining, 
are shaped by a perceived license to operate comprised of social, regulatory and economic 
pressures (Howard-Greenvillet, Nash and Coglianese 2006). Firms are motivated by the 
reputational benefits provided by participation in a voluntary initiative, viewing the adoption of a 
voluntary code of conduct as related to their perceived need to protect their social license to 
operate by maintaining the trust of primary stakeholders, avoiding the attention of environmental 
groups and preserving the company’s reputation as an environmentally-responsible entity 
(Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 2003). While reputational and brand benefits may be sought 
via the adoption of voluntary initiatives primarily as a means of responding to direct pressures, 
Rivera’s analysis of Sustainable Tourism voluntary schemes also indicate that the decision may 
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be influenced by what is perceived as legitimate and acceptable by actors in the company’s 
relevant institutional environments, regardless of direct economic calculations (Rivera 2004).  
Participation in a voluntary initiative is therefore meant to serve as a signal to stakeholders of the 
firm’s association with corporate practices recognized as ‘best practice’ or ‘responsible’ within 
the industry (see Cashore and Vertinsky 2000 on sustainable forestry management). Association 
with a voluntary initiative can therefore enable firms to manage the increasing demands and the 
complexities of its operating environment and enhance its relationship with a variety of 
stakeholders by communicating its commitment and reporting on its activities.  
Drawing on the economic theory of club goods, Prakash and Potoski (2006) argue voluntary 
programs are like clubs in that they offer their membership non-rival, excludable benefits such as 
a positive image, goodwill, legitimacy and reputation for environmental stewardship. Their 
research on the ISO 14000 EMS suggests firms are motivated to adopt codes to reap branding 
benefits such as shared reputation and goodwill that emanate from their association with the 
voluntary club’s brand. Because outside stakeholders (consumers, regulators, investors and 
suppliers) are unable to monitor a firm’s environmental programs and verify a firm’s claims, 
adoption of a voluntary code of conduct can solve information asymmetries between firms and 
their stakeholders, helping them build the firm’s reputation, which in turn shapes their relations 
and interactions with stakeholders (Prakash and Potoski 2006: 777). 
Participation as a means of differentiation or emulation 
Firms may also be motivated to participate by viewing the code of conduct as a cost-effective 
strategy for the firm to attain higher reputational status and differentiate themselves from 
competitors. A strategic desire to differentiate a firm’s practice and reputation from those of 
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competing firms is particularly strong for those perceived negatively by stakeholders in the case 
of ISO 14000 (Prakash and Potoski 2006). Studies on the chemical industry have found industry-
wide initiatives emerging where companies hold collective reputations, whereby a bad image of 
the industry impacts all companies, regardless of a firm’s individual performance (Prakash 2000; 
Auld, Bernstein and Cashore 2008). 
Firms that have already implemented internal policies or practices may view adopting a code as a 
means to seek recognition thereby reinforcing their reputations. Others, who have not 
implemented internal policies and practices, may adopt a code of conduct as part of a broader 
reorientation of corporate strategy towards sustainability, often driven by competitive pressures 
in their industry (Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). Firms may adopt strategies through a 
modelling process based on competitors that are perceived to be successful. Firms may then 
participate, seeking to emulate the behaviour of others as a means of appearing legitimate or 
where management is uncertain about the sources of competitive advantage, as illustrated in the 
growth of ‘sustainable tourism’ voluntary standards (Rivera 2004).  
Related to these strategic motivations, studies on alternative markets and sustainable product 
certification schemes highlight the material and normative aspects of corporate strategy (see 
Giovannucci and Ponte 2005 on sustainability initiatives in the coffee industry). A market 
rationale is apparent in that voluntary participation is viewed as a means of creating an 
alternative market for a differentiate product or service. At the same time, however, corporate 
strategy is shaped by a normative logic as firm participation consists of active engagement in 
establishing the norm that such an alternative market for ‘green’ products exists. 
Preventative action towards more intrusive state regulation 
44 
 
The ability of the government to influence firms’ behaviour has been found to be significant, 
even when regulations have not been enacted and no specific penalties are imposed (Cashore and 
Vertinsky 2000). Institutional theory emphasizes the role of legal institutions in shaping 
corporate strategy. Threats of new environmental regulations or explicit government support of 
beyond-compliance environmental practices are known to be significant incentives for firms to 
participate in voluntary environmental initiatives (Rivera 2004). These government pressures 
have a higher impact on firms that face greater monitoring because they are more likely to be 
affected by government decisions. Firms facing higher government oversight also tend to have 
more information about regulatory and enforcement trends.  
In some cases business self-regulation and the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct may 
represent a political strategy for avoiding additional or more intrusive regulation. Several studies 
have found the adoption of codes to serve as a form of preventative action by firms. For 
example, Responsible Care, the chemical industry’s code of conduct was adopted by several 
national chemical associations in part to forestall national laws establishing more stringent plant 
safety standards following the chemical plant explosion at Bhopal, India in 1984 (King and 
Lenox 2000). Studies examining the International Chamber of Commerce’s Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development have argued its initiation by global firms was at least in part driven by 
fears that the 1992 Rio Earth Summit would lead to an expansion of international environmental 
regulation.  Likewise, in an analysis of ISO 14000 standards, Clapp finds industry support and 
adoption to represent a strategy to pre-empt, or at least soften, present and future state-
determined environmental regulations (Clapp 1998: 295). Firms may therefore seek to engage 
proactively with the corporate responsibility agenda and activists in an effort to deflect or dilute 
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certain pressures while seeking to influence the evolution of future regulation and standards  
(Utting 2002, Fuchs 2005).  
As a related issue, studies have also shown firms adopt and comply with codes of conduct as a 
means of demonstrating and providing evidence of due diligence (OECD 2001; Lenox and Nash 
2003). Where regulatory measures may have not clarified the nature of due diligence obligations 
for an industry or in an evolving issue-area, adoption of a widely-adopted and recognized code of 
conduct may be viewed strategically as a means of demonstrating the exercise of due diligence.  
Firm-specific motivations 
Finally, several studies have also identified firm-specific motivations for adopting a code of 
conduct which are outside of social pressures emanating from external stakeholders or the firm’s 
institutional environment. Studies found that the formal education and environmental expertise 
of senior management and the CEO in particular also correlates with firm participation and early 
adoption of climate change strategies in the oil and gas sector. These findings are reinforced by 
additional research which suggests managerial attitudes and values and the presence of proactive 
individuals influences firm responses (Hoffman 2001).   
Summary 
The above framework offers a number of plausible explanations for the emergence and adoption 
of voluntary initiatives. The review has identified well-established theories from the business 
school and political economy literature, focusing on factors that are alleged to be highly relevant 
to corporate strategy. While the utilitarian ‘business case for CSR’ explanation remain the 
dominant mode of thinking on this issue, importantly, empirical research suggests the need for a 
more nuanced understanding of firm motivations as developed in the concept of complex market 
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rationalism (Vogel 2008). To respond to the primary research question of what has motivated 
institutional investors to adopt responsible investment practices and commit to the PRI, the 
following chapter will test the explanatory power of the identified theories, applying them to a 
detailed analysis of responsible investment among institutional investors. A key assumption is 
that as the first global voluntary ‘responsible investing’ initiative, the decision to participate in 
the Principles for Responsible Investment is directly linked to the broader motivational forces 
behind the growth of responsible investment practices among institutional investors. The 
following chapter will therefore explore the broad trends behind the growth of responsible 






Chapter 4 – The growth of responsible investment among institutional investors 
 
The ‘materiality of ESG issues  
The factors behind the emergence of ESG integration and responsible investing are most 
commonly argued by the institutional investors themselves to be the result of a growing 
awareness of the impact of ESG factors on the financial performance of companies (UNEP FI 
AMWG 2007; BSR 2009). These publicly cited reasons tend to reinforce the dominance of the 
business school explanation. The ‘materiality of ESG issues’ rests on the market rationale that a 
business case exists for sustainability and suggests that the consideration and integration of ESG 
issues in investment decision-making results in the improved analysis and risk/return 
characteristics of investments. The increased awareness of the ‘materiality’ of ESG issues is 
driven by a growing body of academic and industry research that has bolstered the investment 
case for considering ESG issues, and has shown that contrary to modern portfolio theory, 
underperformance is not linked to responsible investment strategies.  
Conventional financial theory has generally been dismissive of the inclusion of ‘non-financial’ 
ESG issues in investment strategies. The assumption is that the introduction of non-financial 
factors into investment decision-making, through the use of negative screens excluding sectors 
such as oil and gas or weapons manufacturers, will harm diversification and thereby incur 
penalties in terms of risk and return (UNEP FI 2005). However, empirical research has been 
influential to the growth of the business-case justification for the inclusion of environmental, 
social and governance issues in investment decision-making and adoption of responsible 
investment practices. A growing body of research has challenged these beliefs, indicating that 
corporate environmental performance can be material to financial performance. Moreover, 
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studies have shown that the adoption of responsible investment practices may have the ability to 
increase portfolio risk-adjusted rates of returns. This represents a pronounced shift from 
historical perceptions of the value of integrating environmental and social issues into valuations 
as being negligible or even negative. Although there is still significant scepticism about the 
positive impact of ESG integration on financial performance in mainstream finance, the increase 
both in volume and sophistication of studies demonstrating outperformance has served to 
legitimize the discourse surrounding responsible investment and the active integration of 
corporate ESG performance data.  
Operating in a world of constant calculation of risk and return, the long-term, temporal nature of 
decisions made by institutional investors requires greater information about the underlying 
fundamentals of the firms in which they invest. Climate change, for example, can pose 
significant (and varying) physical, regulatory, litigation and competitive risks for individual 
firms and entire sectors with the potential of seriously impacting the financial performance of a 
company over time. Adjustments in average temperatures and the frequency and magnitude of 
extreme weather events has the potential to cause property damage, pollution-related liabilities, 
business and supply-chain interruptions and loss of utility services – physical impacts to 
businesses that pose significant financial risks. In addition to physical risks, determining the 
competitive risks a firm faces is an important consideration in calculating the financial value of a 
firm. A company’s climate risk preparedness in relation to its competitors is a key factor in 
determining its ability to compete over a longer time horizon. Companies that have become 
laggards in adapting to consumer and regulatory demands are likely to require costly retrofits and 
are likely to therefore become less competitive in relation to their industry peers.  
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Additionally, increased stakeholder pressures – most notably from civil society organisations – 
have impacted or have the ability to impact corporate financial performance and hence, the 
investor’s calculation of risk and return. Pressures from civil society organisations have changed 
the liability landscape for companies and contributed to the transformation of business risks 
considered by the firm in their strategic calculations. Activists have changed what risk means in 
the modern era through their ability to impose direct costs on companies by undermining 
reputations, bringing lawsuits and limiting sales and investment in companies that violate norms 
(Ruggie and Kell 1999). Many global firms tend to be particularly sensitive to reputational risks 
with the growing importance of intangible goods such as branding and goodwill. To the degree 
that activists, media and other institutions are able to successfully link the activities of a 
company or its investor with negative outcomes such as environmental degradation or 
corruption, then that actor is more likely to consider changing its behaviour (Sustainability and 
UNEP 2001). To illustrate, share prices measure expectations of future returns based on all 
available information. Attacks on brand image and reputation bring new information to capital 
markets that may dampen these future expectations. As a result, there is increasing concern 
among investors of the threats of systemic attacks on brand image and corporate reputation 
because such attacks can have a direct impact on portfolio-wide risk calculations and long-term 
returns through adverse current and future stock price changes.  
The potential regulatory risk a company faces is also critical for investors seeking a complete 
understanding of a company’s net present and future value. In the case of climate change, active 
strategies by NGOs have pressured international, national, state and local governments to 
regulate companies with greenhouse gas emissions from operations or products to reduce those 
emissions and to purchase and trade carbon credits. Understanding how individual companies 
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and sectors are incorporating current and potential regulatory risk into capital investment 
decisions and strategic planning are important in the valuation of a firm.  
Finally, stakeholder pressures have also introduced liability risks. According to a report by 
SustainAbility, legal risks have increased due to a “well funded litigation industry, highly 
motivated legal activists; expanding boundaries of liability in both legal and accounting terms 
and a decline in societal trust in business (SustainAbility 2004). As an example, in 2006, the 
Attorney General of California filed a nuisance suit against six automakers arguing the car 
manufacturers should be held responsible for damages caused by the emissions produced by their 
products, as well as for the costs of monitoring and combating climate change in the state 
(Kiernan 2009). Should courts hold the companies liable in such cases, the potential liability is 
immense. Moreover, the costs of litigation and reputation effects incurred by companies involved 
could be damaging in their own right to the value of the firm’s common shares. By turning CSR 
into a feature of risk management, stakeholder pressures have altered the competitive landscape 
for companies. Responsible investment, considered to constitute the integration of ESG issues 
into investment decision-making is therefore framed as a key component of strategic planning, 
enabling investors to identify and mitigate risks and identify opportunities in the investment 
process to better deliver long-term value.  
In general, studies show that investments selected on the basis of identifiable ESG factors – such 
as eco-efficiency, employee engagement and corporate governance – do tend to outperform, 
serving to legitimize the business case for responsible investment (See Bauer et al 2006; Edmans 
2007; Association of British Insurers 2008).  The evidence in terms of fund performance is less 
clear cut. A 2007 review of the academic literature analysing the performance of funds adopting 
SRI screening suggests that out of eleven studies, three identified positive results, two were 
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negative and six were generally neutral (UNEP FI AMWG 2007). A 2008 paper surveyed 
sixteen studies between 1992 and 2007 and concluded that two showed a positive relationship, 
one identified a negative relationship, with the remainder concluding that SRI funds did not 
exhibit any significant difference in performance from other funds (Kiernan 2009). Finally, a 
2009 report by Mercer Investment Consulting surveyed sixteen studies which apply traditional 
finance theory to ESG factors, spanning a variety of research methods, regional samples and 
investment approaches (such as screening, integration and shareholder engagement). This report 
found that the majority of the studies (ten) showed a positive relationship between ESG factors 
and companies’ financial performance; four studies indicated a neutral relationship and two 
which showed a neutral to negative relationship (Mercer 2009).  
There are also a number of qualitative rationales cited to explain the value of ESG integration. 
Many investors describe strong ESG performance as a proxy for strong and effective 
management (BSR 2009; Goldman Sachs 2007). Identification and oversight of ESG issues 
facing the firm in its operations is argued to be an indicator of a management team that has a 
high awareness of the company’s external operating environment partnered with a keen ability to 
identify emerging issues, risks and opportunities to the firm (Hudson 2006). Similarly, positive 
ESG performance is considered by some to serve as an indicator for a company’s ability to 
manage risk and adapt in the face of new challenges in their business models. In line with this, 
portfolio managers are increasingly considering ESG performance as a part of understanding 
business context.  
Investors also state that strong ESG performance is indicative of a company’s ability to take a 
long-term and strategic approach to growth. Companies focused on short-term returns and 
immediate payouts are less likely to invest in ESG issues as well as in other intangible initiatives 
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that create long-term value. However, companies that can anticipate changes in the marketplace 
driven by ESG issues are increasingly perceived as being poised to turn challenges into 
opportunities. Consequently, although questions about direct correlations between the integration 
of ESG issues, corporate performance and financial returns persist, many investors are 
recognizing the value of ESG integration in other ways. Lengthening the investment horizons are 
argued to enhance long-term value while active ownership is seen as protecting and 
strengthening investments. To that end, investors are increasingly accepting and understanding 
that responsible investment and ESG factors can play a role in supporting strong fiduciary 
responsibility (BSR 2009; PRI 2007).  
Publicly stated reasons and motivations listed by institutional investors would therefore seem to 
support functionalist cost-benefit assumptions that institutional investors adopt ‘responsible’ 
investment practices in light of growing empirical research that demonstrates the materiality of 
ESG issues. Institutional investors have marketed responsible investment as an aspect of their 
direct risk management strategies, identifying that corporate environmental performance can 
impact financial performance thereby improving the risk/return profile of their investments.    
Evolving views on RI and the fiduciary responsibilities of pension trustees 
Outside of the growth in empirical research that indicates ESG issues can be material to 
corporate financial performance, a second broad trend influencing institutional investor practices 
regards the interpretation of fiduciary duty vis-à-vis the inclusion of ESG issues in investment 
decision-making. Historically, the uptake of responsible investment and integration of ESG 
issues by pension funds and other institutional investors remained low due to a tendency to 
interpret fiduciary duty as requiring short-term financial performance while obstructing the 
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consideration of any stakeholder interests outside the financial interests of beneficiaries (UNEP 
FI 2005). A barrier for the active consideration of corporate ESG performance has therefore been 
the interpretation of the law that fiduciary duty equates to profit maximisation. This has 
produced an environment where pension funds are likely to be apprehensive about creating an 
investment strategy premised on long-term investment which comprises a wider stakeholder 
group out of concern that it may be interpreted by courts as violating fiduciary duty (UNEP FI 
2005). Importantly, however, the question of whether it is permissible to consider ESG issues 
has been challenged by legal opinions in the last decade, shifting the debate towards whether it is 
a requirement to consider ESG issues. Institutional investors have subsequently faced growing 
political and regulatory pressure to clarify the extent to which they integrate corporate ESG 
performance into their investment decision-making (BSR 2009).  
In OECD countries, most legislation establishes a fiduciary relationship between investors and 
the manager of the investor’s funds. Fiduciary duties apply to trustees directly and to fund 
managers and investment consultants indirectly and act as the ‘key source of limits on the 
discretion of investment decision-makers in common law jurisdictions (UNEP FI 2005: 8) 
Broadly, fiduciary duties are duties imposed upon a person who exercises some discretionary 
power in the interests of another person in circumstances that give rise to a relationship of trust 
and confidence (UNEP FI 2005: 8) Thus, while an investor fund’s considerations of ESG issues 
may take a broader conception of the fiduciary’s interest, most legislation restricts the 
responsibility to maximizing the investment’s expected risk-adjusted returns. This interpretation 
of fiduciary duty is particularly strong in the case of pension funds and their core duties of 
loyalty and prudence. 
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In Anglo-American trust law, fiduciary duty structures the way pension fund trustees manage 
fund assets for beneficiaries. It has two core components: the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
prudence. The duty of loyalty requires pension fund trustees to act in the sole interests, or in 
some circumstances, the best interests, of beneficiaries when carrying out their investment 
strategy. While beneficiary interests must remain paramount, legal provisions do not explicitly 
prevent investment strategies from creating positive outcomes for non-beneficiaries. The duty of 
prudence requires pension fund trustees to act with prudence, or skill, care and diligence, in 
managing funds for beneficiaries. In the U.S., the duty of prudence is contained in the modern 
prudent investor rule, which requires trustees to “manage trust assets as a prudent investor 
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of 
the trust.” (Richardson 2007) In the U.K., trustees must “exercise such care and skill as is 
reasonable in the circumstances.”    
Significantly, the prevailing view of fiduciary duty presenting a barrier to the inclusion of ESG 
factors in investment strategy has been criticised by several recent legal opinions. In a 2005 
report by Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Deringer, the global law firm was asked to determine whether 
the integration of ESG issues ‘into investment policy (including asset allocation, portfolio 
construction and stock-picking or bond picking) is voluntarily permitted, legally required or 
hampered by law and regulation; primarily as regards to public and private pension funds.” 
(UNEP FI 2005, 8) The report explored a mix of common and civil law jurisdictions: Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the U.K. and the US. In summarizing the study 
and their conclusion, Freshfields argued that “conventional investment analysis focuses on value, 
in the sense of financial performance…the links between ESG factors and financial performance 
are increasingly being recognised. On that basis, integrating ESG considerations into an 
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investment analysis is clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions.” (UNEP 
FI 2005: 12)  
In forming their opinion, Freshfields argued that the links between ESG factors and financial 
performance were increasingly recognized in the sense that integrating ESG considerations can 
contribute to improved risk/return and financial performance. Importantly, consideration of ESG 
issues was firmly rooted in process considerations. Freshfields argued that ‘Trustees must 
consider these factors ‘because there is a body of credible evidence demonstrating [they] often 
have a role to play in the proper analysis of investment value.’(UNEP FI 2005: 9)  That said, 
Freshfields concluded that this did not alter the trustees’ discretion in assigning a weight to these 
factors. In fact, fiduciaries remain free to decide that, for instance, they will have no material 
effect on the investment’s performance. But, Freshfields argues, they must assess them and that 
assessment must take place within the disciplined investment process expected of fiduciaries.  
In addition, integrating ESG factors to include beneficiaries’ views and to decide between 
investments of the same value are also accepted.  The report argued that while it is difficult to 
find consensus as to the interests of beneficiaries, it is accepted that the average beneficiary 
would agree not to invest in investments that are linked to breaches of human rights, labour 
conditions, corruption or environmental degradation. Freshfields also cited that ‘a majority of the 
jurisdictions have legislated (or are expected to do so shortly) to require investment decision-
makers, particularly in the pensions context, to disclose the extent to which they take ESG 
considerations into account.’ (UNEP FI 2005: 11) Related to this final point, the following 




Government monitoring of institutional investor behavior via disclosure-based regulation 
Since 2000, various governments (as detailed below) have relied on informational policy 
instruments in the form of legislation requiring pension funds to disclose their policies on 
environmental, social and ethical considerations. Pension fund regulatory authorities in most 
OECD countries have taken a relatively passive stance towards encouraging the consideration of 
ESG issues in investment decision-making. At present, where in existence, the approach taken by 
regulatory authorities relies largely on disclosure requirements which require pension funds to 
inform their clients of the extent to which such ESG or ethical factors are incorporated into the 
fund’s investment strategy. While regulatory developments have not mandated the adoption of 
responsible investment practices, increasingly such actions have created space for institutional 
investors to take these approaches, removing some of the barriers in certain jurisdictions and 
imposing more stringent requirements in other regions.   
The first jurisdiction to establish such requirements was the U.K. in 2000 when the U.K. Pension 
Act was amended to require trustees of occupational pension plans to disclose their policy on 
SRI as part of their Statement of Investment Principles. In doing so, trustees are required to 
declare ‘the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken 
into account in the selection, retention and realization of investments’ and ‘the policy (if any) 
directing the exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attached to investments.’ As well, 
U.K. courts have concluded that the concept of beneficiaries ‘best interest’ under a pension trust 
may extend beyond their financial interests to include their views on moral and social matters.  
In Australia, the Financial Services Reform Act (2000) which requires that all products with an 
investment component – including superannuation funds and mutual funds – include disclosure 
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of the extent to which labour standards or environmental, social or ethical considerations are 
taken into account in the selection, retention and realization of the investment.  
Indeed, like the U.K. and Australia, many other states have put similar rules in place with regards 
to occupational pension funds: Sweden, France and Germany in 2001; Norway, Belgium and 
Italy in 2005; Austria in 2005; and Spain (pending). Additional pending regulation is under 
discussion at the EU level where the European Directive on Institutions of Occupational 
Retirement Provision Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has proposed the inclusion 
of ‘full disclosure of a funds’ ethical and socially responsible investment principles in its 
statement of investment principles.’ 
In Canada, only Manitoba specifically permits consideration of ‘non-financial’ criteria permitted 
that trustees and administrators still satisfy the requisite standard of care. Subsequently, a 2007 
NRTEE report on capital markets called for disclosure rules for pension plans in Canada similar 
to those in the U.K. and the 2008 Arthurs Commission in Ontario has made similar 
recommendations. In October 2009, a private member’s motion was introduced in the House of 
Commons calling on public and private pension plans to disclose how they track and manage 
ESG-related risks.  
A more proactive and prescriptive form of legislation has been applied to public pension funds in 
many OECD countries, and especially to the national pension reserve funds that have been 
established in recent years to help finance public pension systems. In several jurisdictions, 
legislation is more explicit in requiring the consideration of ESG or ‘social responsibility’ issues 
and risks in investment strategies, though the degree of detail required in disclosure varies.  
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In New Zealand, for example, legislation states that public pension funds are to ‘avoid prejudice 
to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the world community’ and to disclose 
its policy regarding investments. In Canada, legislation has gone further where federal legislation 
establishing the CPPIB calls on its board members to address social and environmental risks in 
its investment strategy. Likewise, provincial legislation establishing OMERS and OTPPB require 
consideration of social responsibility issues. French legislation governing the state Fond de 
Reserve pour les Retraites (FRR) goes further than Canadian legislation in that it requires FRR to 
include in its investment policy how it accounts for social, environmental and ethical issues.  
The most progressive legislation is found in legislation governing Norwegian and Swedish 
public pension funds. Norway’s 2004 ethical guidelines require negative screening of companies 
producing certain categories of weapons, exclusion of companies responsible for human rights 
violations, gross corruption and environmental degradation and a corporate governance policy 
which targets long-term financial returns, mainly formed on the basis of UN Global Compact 
and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In the Swedish Public Pension Funds Act of 
2000, national pension funds must describe how environmental and ethical considerations are 
considered in investment activities and the impact of such considerations on fund management 
decisions. According to the law, funds may not own shares in companies that violate the funds’ 
policies on the environment and ethics. The finance department has the responsibility of 
controlling whether funds are applying the laws. Since 2002, Sweden’s AP funds ‘must take 
environmental and ethical considerations into account without relinquishing the overall goal of a 
high return on capital.’ 
Interestingly, the US presents a counter case to developments surrounding disclosure of ESG 
consideration by pension plans throughout OECD countries. A US Department of Labor’s 
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Pension Welfare & Benefit Administration advisory opinion from May 1998 has remained a 
major barrier. The opinion has been broadly interpreted as concluding pension fund trustees or 
managers may be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility if they engage in SRI which 
demonstrably results in lower returns than alternatives. Thus, US pension funds have been wary 
of negative screening based on SRI-type themes or ESG factors.  
Upon reflection of these various state-induced regulations, it can be argued that mandatory 
standards for institutional investors and other financiers are rare and tend towards a reliance on 
informational policy instruments. Bolder proposals such as a proposed amendment to Britain’s 
Financial Services and Market Act (2000) to include sustainable development as one of the 
principal considerations of the regulator’s mandate have been rejected to date. Regarding the 
regulation of pension funds, disclosure has been the focus particularly in those markets where 
investors are free to choose among pension funds (in most personal or retail-based private 
pension systems, including the mandatory defined contribution systems in OECD countries). In 
these cases, the pension fund is often viewed as a simple intermediary and disclosure is viewed 
attractively in that it allows beneficiaries and potential members to consider how ESG factors 
may affect the future evolution of their investment portfolio.  
While regulation that mandates disclosure has been applauded by some, others have raised issues 
and cited shortcomings in the ability of the regulation to challenge conventional investment 
practice. First, disclosure regulations have not provided a standard definition and classification of 
SRI or ESG integration. None have required or declared a separation of ethical considerations 
from ESG risks which is problematic given empirical research which indicates differing financial 
performance. Second, all disclosure-based regulations have left a high degree of discretion on the 
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type and content of disclosures made by institutional investors and regulators have remained 
silent on how pension funds should integrate ESG criteria into their investments.  
Referring to the literature on firm participation in voluntary initiatives, several studies have 
found threats of new regulation or explicit government support of beyond-compliance 
environmental practices to be significant incentives for participation (Rivera 2004). Reflecting 
on regulatory trends in several OECD countries, institutional investors are increasingly subject to 
disclosure-based regulations that require investors clarify the extent to which ESG issues are 
integrated into their decision-making processes. Furthermore, uncertainty relating to the 
fiduciary responsibilities of institutional investors has created pressures for trustees to 
demonstrate and provide evidence of due diligence although the legal interpretations have not 
clarified the nature of the fiduciary obligation.  
While not mandating the inclusion of corporate environmental performance, legislation has 
raised the profile of responsible investment practices, requiring institutional investors to disclose 
whether they consider ESG issues. Such developments suggest firms may be motivated to adopt 
responsible investment practices and participate in the Principles for Responsible Investment as a 
strategy for avoiding additional or more intrusive regulation in the future. As a means of taking 
preventative action, institutional investors may seek to engage proactively, interpreting 
disclosure-based regulations as part of broader regulatory trends concerning their behaviour as 
investors. Investor involvement in the creation of the PRI and subsequent widespread 
participation may be understood as an effort to deflect or dilute certain regulatory pressures. As 
an example, the CEO of Robeco, a Dutch asset manager and signatory to the PRI addressed an 
industry event calling on the asset management industry “to take the lead in ESG and show how 
we can set an example instead of waiting for government to impose rules on us.” (Responsible 
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Investor 2009) On this point, several institutional investor associations have also publicly noted 
the importance of proactively considering ESG issues and adopting the PRI as a means of 
mitigating the risk of regulatory intervention and influencing the evolution of future regulations 
and standards (Mercer Investment Consulting 2009; Eurosif 2009; Allianz Global Investors 
2010).  
Stakeholder pressures from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
The rise of responsible investment among institutional investors cannot be isolated from the 
increased presence and activity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who have put 
increased pressure on institutional investors to align their interests with broader societal goals. 
NGOs have opportunities to influence corporate conduct via direct, indirect, and interactive 
influences on the investment community. Tactically, civil society organizations have deployed 
two often complementary techniques in an advocacy role: first, pressuring investors to invest 
capital in one company or sector rather than another; and, second, using the rights and influence 
associated with share ownership to voice concerns directly with company directors and senior 
management (activists often file shareholder resolutions related to social or environmental issues 
at corporate annual meetings, or use other measures including the media to try and shape 
corporate actions).  
While the majority of early interventions were antagonistic, focusing on disrupting AGMs, the 
tactics of NGOs have steadily become much more sophisticated. Recent years have seen NGOs 
employ a range of approaches, including the production of investment analysis in support of their 
campaign issues (Waygood 2006); direct attempts to move capital into certain investment 
projects and out of others (Ougaard 2002); ongoing programs of communication with investors 
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in relation to specific issues of CSR; and, in some cases, formal programs of collaboration 
between investors and NGOs. More strategically, some NGOs have also engaged in public 
policy advocacy on the rules that govern the capital market, focusing primarily on issues of 
short-termism and market failure. In sum, the overall influence of NGOs as major actors in 
promoting responsible investment is growing with attendant consequences for the corporate 
strategies of institutional investors (Guay, Doh, Sinclair 2004; Sparkes and Cowton 2004; 
Waygood 2006). 
Why are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) targeting capital markets and how this has 
influenced institutional investor behaviour (i.e. how this has created pressure and influenced risk 
management strategies of institutional investors to consider ESG issues)? As the following 
analysis indicates, investors are increasingly working with, and/or being influenced by, civil 
society organizations such as non-governmental advocacy, activist and consumer groups. The 
primary goals of these actors are, ostensibly, quite different than the financial motivations of 
investors. Increasingly, however, they view institutional investors as a strategic means to 
leverage the private sector and influence corporations via shareholder activism.  
For an expanding body of institutions representing civil society – notably environmental, 
development, and human rights organizations – capital markets are seen not just as an 
instrumental mechanism for changing corporate practices, but also as a target for systemic 
change because their current structure undermines long-term sustainable development goals. In 
some cases, these campaigners have influenced the target company’s cost of capital, tarnished its 
reputation and mobilized significant shareholder votes against management. In a few extreme 
cases, campaigners have also motivated company brokers to reject clients and stock markets in 
order to bar listings.  
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Waygood (2006) documents 30 NGOs in the U.K. alone that have used the capital market as a 
part of their company campaigning. Examples of such campaigning include Greenpeace, 
Amnesty International and World Wide Fund for Nature campaigning Shell to publish a 
corporate responsibility report to shareholders as a result of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
who had been campaigning against the devastation of the Niger Delta by Shell and others; 
Surfers against Sewage questioning the board at South West Water’s AGM about its policy in 
relation to marine dumping of sewage; Christian Aid targeting British Petroleum (BP) and other 
institutional investors in PetroChina, due to the latter’s involvement in Sudan where an oil-
funded civil was under way; and the Campaign against the Arms Trade ‘naming and shaming’ 
pension funds with holdings in defence companies.  
The rapid growth in capital market campaigning has created new risks for companies and their 
primary investors, institutional investors, and has not gone unnoticed. The Financial Times listed 
‘growing pressures from international NGOs, armed with unprecedented resources, credibility, 
access to company data and global communications capabilities’ (Kiernan 2005) as one of the 
five socio-economic mega-trends affecting the security and earning power of long-term 
retirement savings.  
Zadek (1998) argues that one emerging role of civil society is to regulate corporate behaviour, 
deeming such activity ‘civil regulation’ – with the capital markets being just one arena within 
which this takes place. More broadly, the literature on the active engagement of civil society in 
market governance identifies three main contributions that NGOs can make.  
First, NGO campaigns can be an effective method of achieving welfare-enhancing social and/or 
environmental goals. Davis et al. (2006) argue that NGOs have a specific role in creating a more 
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sustainable economy. In a civil society, they argue, “parallel institutions of a civil economy can 
be understood as engaged shareowners, independent monitors, credible standards and civil-
society organisations participating in the marketplace.” Davis et al. (2006) and others argue that 
civil society organisations are an important and legitimate lever to ensure that financial 
institutions advocate socially responsible management to the companies in which they invest.  
An additional reading of the role of civil society is that by enhancing information flows 
regarding corporate performance on social, ethical and environmental issues that may be material 
to share price, NGOs can improve investment analysis. One practical reason why NGOs may be 
a useful source of relevant investment information is that they tend to spend time analysing and 
lobbying for changes to public policy. Consequently, NGOs may be a useful indicator of future 
public policy that could be material to company evaluation. Where NGO capital market 
intervention contributes to enhanced investment analysis, that intervention is legitimate because 
it helps to improve investment decisions and market efficiency (Zadek 1998; Waygood 2006).  
Finally, while NGO capital market intervention may serve to improve investment analysis, there 
are circumstances in which it has been detrimental to a company’s share price. Although 
campaigns may represent a short-term financial burden for a company, this alone is not a 
sufficient reason to render the activity illegitimate. This is because companies benefit from the 
existence of the capital market, and the existence of any market depends, in part, upon society’s 
trust in order to maintain its own legitimacy. As Korten (1995) argues, an economic system can 
remain viable only so long as society has mechanisms to counter the abuses of either state or 
market power. Increased scrutiny by civil society has therefore been argued to serve an important 
function in enhancing market trust, contributing to the long-term viability of capital markets.  
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Historically, NGOs have relied on purchasing shares of corporations, engaging in shareholder 
activism using proxies and other strategies to pressure individual companies to change corporate 
behaviour. An example of this strategy are the tactics used by Friends of the Earth (FOE) with 
Exxon-Mobil in the early 1990s when FOE staff and supporters attended the annual Exxon 
shareholders meeting following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. At the meeting, FOE raised 
questions of the Chairman and Board of Directors on the failure of Exxon to exercise precaution 
in the transport of crude oil. At the 1990 Exxon shareholder meeting, FOE arranged for the filing 
of four shareholder resolutions to pressure Exxon to adopt better safety procedures and 
environmental practices. In total, the NGO was able to obtain proxies for over 400,000 shares 
from its membership and supporter base. FOE also worked in an unsuccessful effort to have 
former Senator Gaylord Nelson, founder of Earth Day placed on Exxon’s Board. While in these 
cases, the positions of FOE were unsuccessful in changing the outcome of Exxon’s policies, 
FOE’s tactics did persuade other NGOs and shareholders to support their position, bringing 
unwelcomed public attention to Exxon’s corporate practices.  
NGOs have also sought influence by working directly with traditional SRI funds, serving as 
advisors and experts on ethical and social responsibility screens used to determine the 
composition of such funds. In this capacity, NGOs have engaged by providing advice, 
consultation and input for SRI funds and in some cases, including the Sierra Club, have 
sponsored funds, often focusing on a particular subset of SRI practices.  
More recent developments, however, suggest a shift in the strategies of NGOs. NGOs are 
increasingly using their status to urge institutional shareholders such as large public employee 
pension and retirement funds to pressure change in corporate governance and conduct. In this 
way, NGO advocacy efforts have increasingly focused on scrutinizing the practices of 
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institutional investors, pressing these investors to engage in more socially responsible investing. 
NGO direct and interactive influences include ad-hoc campaigns which rely on ‘naming and 
shaming’ of pension funds with holdings in target companies. Direct lobbying and media 
campaigns have also focused on influencing pension scheme beneficiaries (most notably trade 
unions and professional bodies).  
The most significant recent development in NGO campaigning is, however, the emergence of 
formal partnerships with institutional investors. This represents a notable shift in tone from 
adversary to partner as partnerships seek-out common interests. NGOs have increasingly altered 
the tone of their campaigns to one which is firmly couched in the materiality discourse, arguing 
that a concern for environmental and social performance is a requirement of institutional 
investor’s long-term fiduciary responsibilities and that considering ESG issues results in 
enhanced investment analysis and proactive measures to address long-term systemic market 
failures. Symptomatic of the change in strategy, was a 2002 report by Ceres (preceding the 
launch of the Investor Network on Climate Risk) that concluded that U.S. company directors and 
institutional investors face a growing financial and legal risk that global climate change will 
adversely affect the value of the assets for which they have fiduciary responsibility. While 
climate change is an extraordinarily complex issue, this report’s message to U.S. corporate 
directors and institutional investors is straightforward: failure to assess the risks of climate 
change for one’s company or investment portfolio would not only be imprudent, it could 
represent a significant breach of fiduciary responsibility and carry potentially serious legal 
liabilities (Ceres 2002).  
Examples of formal partnerships between NGOs and institutional investors include the 
aforementioned INCR (launched by Ceres) and the Carbon Disclosure Project that focus on 
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climate change-related risks and company disclosure. More targeted partnerships include WWF 
and Insight Investment working together to benchmark the U.K. house-building sector’s 
performance on sustainable homes; Flora and Fauna International working with Aviva Investors, 
F&C, Insight Investment, Pax World and other institutional investors on the Natural Value 
Initiative, which seeks to benchmark the food production, processing and distribution sectors’ 
performance on biodiversity issues; Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS) working with Forum 
for the Future to identify the financial benefits of sustainable investment in their ‘Sustainable 
Pays’ report; and Transparency International working with F&C on bribery and corruption 
issues. When done successfully, the NGO receives the influence, corporate access, authority, 
resources and financial support of the investor. In turn, the institutional investor receives 
improved access to policy expertise, research resources and better-on-the-ground corporate 
performance information.  
Stakeholder pressures from beneficiaries 
Related to stakeholder pressures from NGOs, beneficiary pressures have evolved to focus on 
‘CSR’ issues so that institutional investors are increasingly cognizant of their own social license 
to operate and brand/reputation. Institutional investors and pension funds, in particular, operate 
simultaneously on the capital market, the acquisition market and the labour market. They also 
operate on what has been referred to as the “market of social acceptance.” (Weber 2008) This is 
the market on which schemes receive their social mandate through the trade in reputation and 
‘license to operate’ defined as the perceived legitimacy of the scheme in offering services in 
general, and to their participants in particular. Ultimately, the legitimacy of a pension fund lies in 
its ability to serve the interests of the beneficiaries. Maintaining a ‘social license to operate’ has 
become an important element in the daily management of many companies – in particular the 
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mining and extractives industries – who are concerned with anticipating the needs of customers, 
workers and local communities.  
While pension funds do not have to respond to all of society’s demands, they appear to be 
sensitive to broader trends and norms that define socially responsible standards of behaviour. Of 
particular importance has been the broader trend of increased pressure for greater accountability 
- of corporations and its primary beneficiaries, its investors - for the environmental and social 
impacts of its operations not just from stakeholders but also scheme beneficiaries. By 
implication, just as the boundaries of what constitutes responsible corporate conduct have been 
challenged by the corporate social responsibility movement, institutional investors - given their 
dominant role in financial markets and role in representing beneficiaries - are also tuned into 
these normative conditions in their institutional environments and debates as to what is 
considered legitimate and appropriate conduct.  
National opinion data in the U.K. suggests that 75 percent of the public prefer their pension fund 
to consider environmental, ethical, social and governance performance in a way which does not 
put any risk on the investment performance (USS 2003). As public opinion has shifted to put 
greater emphasis on sustainable development, the image and reputation of a pension scheme in 
relation to these trends have come under increasing pressure such that being perceived as a 
‘responsible’ investor has become a central driver behind the growth of responsible investment 
among pension funds and other institutional investors. While these motivational drivers appear to 
be increasingly common across institutional investors and pension schemes as a whole, they 
manifest themselves in different ways. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the 
pressures public and private institutional investors face.  
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Public institutional investors are governed by a board of trustees and receive their investment 
capital by means of primarily mandatory contributions. While governance channels exist in cases 
where beneficiaries of the scheme are dissatisfied with the performance of the board, 
beneficiaries cannot – in general – withdraw their investment capital. Therefore, inherent to their 
organisational structure, public institutional investors are concerned not with competitive 
pressures but rather driven by a need for social legitimacy and being seen to reflect the interests 
and beliefs of its beneficiaries.  
Private institutional investors, rather, are represented by management and actively compete to 
attract investment capital. Beneficiaries of private institutional investors are free to remove and 
relocate their investment capital though sometimes facing minimal penalties for doing so. Private 
institutional investors do not benefit from mandated contributions and must therefore attract and 
retain investment capital. As such, these funds are primarily motivated by competitive concerns. 
In addition to the financial performance of the fund, private institutional investors will seek to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors. As customer preferences change, these private 
funds will seek to adapt their strategies to keep pace or may even pursue strategies in attempt to 
influence customer interests or reap first-mover advantages.  
The centrality of reputational risks and influence of broader societal norms to understanding the 
emergence of responsible investment is confirmed in several industry surveys. The predominant 
response is that the most important consideration for schemes in involving environmental and 
social factors in the investment process is the connection with corporate governance policies and 
the belief that attention for responsible investment enhances a scheme’s ‘reputation.’(Dutch 
Association of Industry-wide Pension Funds 2008) Surveys of the U.K., France, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Switzerland and Italian markets have indicated more than 70 percent of respondents 
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consider public opinion to be the most important factor driving responsible investment (Allianz 
Global Investors 2010). The results of these surveys show the perception that image/reputation as 
a ‘responsible asset owner’ is the number one driver. Political and beneficiary pressures are also 
listed as important factors, again linked to the reputation of the asset owner (Eurosif 2009). 
Remarkably, the group of pension funds responding to these surveys citing the importance of 
responsible investment as improving risk/return profiles is relatively small. Only one-fifth of 
pension funds in a Dutch national survey, for example, referenced financial considerations for 
shaping their opinions on the value of responsible investment. Against the background of 
common arguments for the consideration of ESG issues as a means of improving risk/return as a 
component of fiduciary responsibility, this finding is at least remarkable. Rather, these results 
suggest the adoption of responsible investment strategies are influenced by a response to direct 
stakeholder pressures (and the perceived threat to the reputation of the investor) as well by what 
is perceived to be legitimate and acceptably by actors in the investor’s relevant institutional 
environments.   
What is driving the growth of Responsible Investment among institutional investors? 
Referring back to the primary research question of what has motivated institutional investors to 
adopt responsible investment practices and publicly commit to the PRI, at first glance, a review 
of motivations publicly cited by institutional investors appears to fit neatly with the business 
school functionalist explanation. These explanations suggest firms adopt beyond-compliance 
measures and responsible investment practices due to the strategic and economic benefits of 
integrating ESG issues into their corporate practices. In the case of responsible investment, 
institutional investors have primarily marketed the ‘business case’ for integrating ESG issues 
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into investment decisions, referring to the materiality of corporate ESG issues on financial 
performance. Although doing so is said to provide tangential benefits for society, the primary 
impetus for investor adoption of responsible investment practices is cited as a component of their 
direct risk management strategies in seeking to improve the risk/return characteristics of 
investments. However, purely financial cost/benefit explanations based on the belief of improved 
investment returns are less persuasive in light of further analysis of the broader influences 
driving the growth of responsible investment among institutional investors. Findings suggest 
investor behaviour is shaped by responses to formal pressures from other organisations and by 
conformity to normative standards established by actors in their institutional environments. 
Regulatory and stakeholder pressures in particular shape investor perceptions of what constitutes 
legitimate or ‘responsible’ behaviour vis-à-vis their interactions with the environment.   
Although not mandating the inclusion of ESG issues into investment decision-making by 
institutional investors, disclosure-based legislation suggests firms may be motivated to adopt 
responsible investment practices as a strategy for avoiding additional or more intrusive 
regulation in the future. By engaging proactively, investors participating in the PRI can be 
understood as an effort on the part of some to mitigate the risk of future regulatory intervention 
or as a strategy of influencing the evolution of future legal norms.  
In addition to regulatory influence, stakeholder pressures have resulted in increased scrutiny of 
the environmental impact and social responsibility of institutional investor behaviour. A review 
of efforts by NGOs and the increase in capital market campaigning indicates that reputational 
risks have been central – yet not sufficiently recognized – to understanding the adoption of 
responsible investment strategies and public commitments to the PRI. Broadly, reputational risks 
in relation to the consideration of ESG issues by institutional investors are a function of 
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stakeholder pressures on institutional investors to adopt an investment approach that is more 
aligned with broader societal interests. Increasingly, institutional investors are subject to 
pressures from external stakeholders (namely NGOs but also beneficiaries) as well as broader 
norms of what constitutes legitimate and socially acceptable behaviour. Not only do institutional 
investors appear concerned about ESG issues in terms of the potential financial or reputational 
risks to companies held within their portfolio, but the preceding analysis would suggest it 
represents a response to pressures vis-à-vis the reputation of the investor.   
First, pressures from NGOs on issues broadly captured under the heading of ‘CSR’ have been 
extended to financial institutions via direct advocacy campaigns. While pressure historically 
focused more on banks and project finance in particular, given their growing size and influence, 
institutional investors have increasingly come under scrutiny in terms of the indirect 
environmental and social impacts of their investments. A significant development has been the 
emergence of several multi-stakeholder initiatives and formal partnerships which seek out 
‘synergies’ between civil society organisation agendas and institutional investors. These 
partnerships range from ad-hoc arrangements for the purposes of information sharing and the 
production of research reports and benchmarking studies to more enduring initiatives such as the 
Carbon Disclosure Project and Ceres’ INCR that seek to leverage institutional investor 
shareholder power for improved corporate disclosure and performance. NGO tactics have 
included ‘naming and shaming’ of pension funds that have significant holdings in targeted 
companies and media campaigns. While the impacts of individual campaigns vary, a common 
theme advocated has been that investors failing to account for issues such as climate change is 
not only imprudent and potentially misaligned with their beneficiary’s interests, but could 
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represent a significant breach of fiduciary responsibility, carrying potentially serious legal 
liabilities.  
Second, and interrelated to the above trend, from an institutionalist perspective norms have 
evolved regarding what is perceived as legitimate and acceptable in an investor’s institutional 
environment. Social expectations have evolved to focus on CSR issues alongside the traditional 
function of financial performance, presenting a reputational risk to the institutional investor. Of 
particular note has been the increase in references made by investors to protecting their own 
brand and maintaining their ‘social license to operate.’ As noted by the CEO of one institutional 
investor (and signatory to the PRI), “failure to integrate ESG will cost [your] license to operate 
in the next ten years.” (Robeco 2009) This phenomenon is made apparent in several industry 
surveys that indicate increasing recognition of needing to be perceived as a ‘responsible’ asset 
owner or investment manager. Remarkably, the group of pension funds and investment managers 
responding to these surveys citing the importance of responsible investment as driven by the 
purely financial logic of the business case explanation is relatively small. Instead, the most 
important consideration for schemes in involving social and environmental factors in the 
investment process is the connection with internal corporate governance policies and the belief 
that attention for responsible investment enhances a scheme’s reputation and aids in securing a 
firm’s social license to operate.  
While the forces influencing public and private institutional investors’ license to operate differ to 
some degree, both have increasingly sought to manage potential reputational risks which may 
affect their competitiveness and perceived reputation. This suggests that, rather than being 
motivated solely by a market rationale, institutional investors may adopt responsible investment 
practices for primarily reputation and brand benefits as well as motivations to take preventative 
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action in response to emerging regulation on disclosure and evolving views of fiduciary 
responsibilities in relation to the incorporation of ESG issues into investment decision-making 
and ownership practices. These findings suggest institutional investors are influenced by 
pressures exerted by external stakeholders and are sensitive to external norms and values in their 
institutional environments that provide a sense of social legitimacy and positive reputation.   
Summary 
In considering the political and regulatory influences and the role of stakeholders and social 
factors in the growth of responsible investment, it is apparent that in operating in a complex and 
evolving environment, institutional investors are subject to external pressures and norms that 
challenge their cost/benefit calculations. Changing regulatory pressures and stakeholder 
expectations have increasingly induced institutional investors to consider environmental, social 
and governance issues. As apparent in the growth of investors committing to the PRI, these 
pressures have induced firms to publicly declare their commitments to integrate stakeholder 
concerns into their corporate practices. In this way, the PRI voluntary code of conduct primarily 
functions as a tool for maintaining or enhancing corporate reputation in an institutional 
environment where it is threatened. Adopting the PRI and thereby signalling an intention to 
conform to responsible investment ‘best practices,’ primarily reflects a strategic desire among 
institutional investors to maintain or acquire a positive reputation within their institutional 
environment.      
The pre-dominant assumption of much of the empirical work on firm participation in voluntary 
initiatives has been that the decision and selection of corporate environmental practices is the 
result of a purely functional, market rationale. The business school explanation emphasizes 
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financial costs and benefits and the strategic and economic benefits (the business case) of 
corporate responsibility (Rivera 2004). A review of the factors behind the growth of responsible 
investment, however, indicates that this explanation is not wholly persuasive in understanding 
why institutional investors have adopted responsible investment practices. Rather, the research 
indicates that institutional investor decision-making regarding the integration of ESG issues and 
adoption of responsible investment practices are shaped by both responses to formal pressures by 
external stakeholders (state regulation and NGO campaigning activity) as well as broader social 
norms shaped by actors in the investor’s institutional environments (articulated in the perceived 
beneficiary and societal expectations). Principally, regulatory and stakeholder influences have 
established normative standards directed towards the conduct of investors. These findings 
support complex market rationalism explanations that suggest firm participation should 
principally be seen as a response to pressures and demands from external stakeholders to 
conform to changing expectations of what is considered legitimate, appropriate or ‘responsible’ 
investor behaviour (Vogel 2008). As such, the decision to adopt the PRI and establish 
commitments to adopting investment decision-making processes and ownership practices 
deemed ‘responsible’ may be seen as embedded in broader reputational risk management 
strategies, grounded in a variety of strategic motivations to assure stakeholders that their 
concerns are being internalized into corporate practices. The next chapter will focus on the 
activities of PRI signatories to assess the extent to which these general findings related to 





Chapter 5 – Analyzing PRI signatory implementation 
 
The preceding analysis indicates that the decision to adopt commitments regarding ‘responsible’ 
investment behaviour can largely be seen as embedded in broader reputational risk management 
strategies of the institutional investor. Concerning the growth of responsible investment and 
public commitment by institutional investors to PRI, research findings indicate that a variety of 
strategic motivations stemming from both direct and non-direct economic calculations have been 
influential in this development.  
The growth of empirical research indicating the ‘materiality’ of ESG issues has strengthened the 
‘business case’ for integrating ESG issues into investment decision-making processes. This 
suggests that the adoption of responsible investment practices and adoption of the PRI may be 
part of a firm’s direct risk management strategy, integrated into the firm’s core practices and 
directly motivated by corporate profitability.  
The analysis here, however, indicates that strategic motivations flow from formal pressures from 
other organisations and by a desire to conform to normative standards established by actors in 
the firm’s institutional environment. In many jurisdictions, disclosure-based regulations have 
required pension funds to clarify the extent to which ESG issues are integrated. Adoption of the 
PRI may also be perceived as a form of preventative action, motivated to proactively respond to 
current or future regulatory trends.  
Finally, the role of stakeholder pressures – most notably from NGOs and beneficiaries - have 
resulted in increased scrutiny of institutional investor behaviour resulting in greater concern on 
the part of investors for reputational risks. This suggests the PRI is adopted to protect a firm’s 
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reputation by assuring stakeholders that it operates responsibly. By publicly committing to the 
PRI, investors can signal commitment to concerns raised by different stakeholders seeking to 
increase its credibility and respond to changing public expectations of what constitutes legitimate 
or ‘responsible’ investor conduct. As well, in some cases, firms who have already adopted 
responsible investment practices may seek to reinforce their reputations or differentiate 
themselves from competitors by committing to the PRI.  
Having established the general motivations for investor adoption of responsible investment 
practices, this chapter analyses publicly available data on PRI signatory implementation 
specifically. Assessing the aggregate responses of PRI signatories to the Reporting and 
Assessment survey enables a deeper understanding of the distributional characteristics of 
institutional investors that have publicly committed to integrating ESG issues into their 
investment decision-making process. Specifically, the extent to which institutional investors have 
internalized their commitments to the PRI code of conduct may point to differences in the 
institutional contexts within which a strategic decision takes place.  
A lack of progress in areas considered core to integrating ESG issues into investment decision-
making may indicate signatories are more interested in the benefits of affiliation with the positive 
brand reputation of the PRI and its UN affiliation than a meaningful commitment to radically 
alter behaviour that economic rationality explanations would suggest. Signatory results in the 
Reporting and Assessment process may be more of a reflection of the extent to which 
commitment to the PRI is used by institutional investors in corporate communications for 
reputation management, rather than strategically motivated by the business case and integrated 
into direct risk management practices.  
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PRI Reporting and Assessment survey data 
All signatories who have been involved in the PRI for more than one year are required to 
complete the reporting and assessment exercise whereas more recent signatories are invited to do 
so voluntarily. Although completion of the exercise is, for some, a requirement, signatories are 
not required to disclose the outcome of their reports. The following qualitative and interpretative 
analysis has been organized along the core implementation areas of the PRI, employing publicly-
available aggregate data from the 2009 PRI Report on Progress. For the 2009 Reporting and 
Assessment survey data analysed in this chapter, the data has been aggregated from 276 
individual responses (124 Asset owners, 152 Investment managers) and made available by 
download from the PRI website.3 The 2009 Reporting and Assessment survey is the third annual 
reporting process which communicates signatory performance against approximately 100 
questions.  
Although individual PRI signatories receive a report benchmarking their progress relative to their 
peer group, this data is not publicly available. Signatories self-report in relation to predominantly 
qualitative indices (e.g. large extent, medium extent, etc.) suggesting the reliability and validity 
of the results may be weakened by the possibility of broad (mis)interpretation. As an internal 
control, the PRI Secretariat seeks to verify a proportion of the responses via phone interviews 
with signatories.4 During verification calls, the PRI Secretariat confirms any assumptions made 
by the signatory in their self-reporting. Although there a (potentially) significant methodological 
problems stemming from the self-reporting and qualitative nature of the survey, it remains the 
                                                            
3 Available at http://www.unpri.org/reporting/result.php 
4 The PRI Secretariat reports having made verification calls with 100 PRI signatories in 2009.  
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only publicly available data set for interpreting the activities of signatories regarding their 
commitments to the PRI.  
Governance, Policy and Strategy  
In terms of governance measures adopted by PRI signatories, the vast majority of responding 
signatories report having a policy which explicitly addresses either responsible investment or 
ESG issues (87 percent of asset owners versus 84 percent of investment managers)(Q55). As 
well, approximately 86 percent of signatories (90 percent of asset owners and 84 percent of 
investment managers) have taken steps ‘to at least some extent’ in translating the policy into a 
plan of action as reflected in business planning, strategic planning or similar internal 
management processes (Q10)(Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 – Translating responsible investment into action 
                                                            
5 This refers to the question numbering as it appears in the 2009 Reporting and Assessment Survey. The full survey 
is available at: http://www.unpri.org/files/20100218_Offline%20Survey.pdf  
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When considering those that have done so ‘to a large extent’ however, the figure drops to only 
25.8 percent of asset owners and 40.1 percent of investment managers suggesting the broader 
majority are only in the initial stages of doing so. Governance structure is also an interesting 
feature to look at, the asset owners were much more likely (2/3 of respondents) to have board 
responsibility for responsible investment whereas 1/3 of investment managers have board of 
directors involved in the oversight of responsible investment activities (Q11).  
Integration of ESG issues by PRI signatories 
PRI signatories are most likely to have a policy that makes specific reference to the incorporation 
of ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes (Q6). Across asset 
classes, signatories report the highest degree of integration in listed equities with 89 percent and 
94 percent of investment managers reporting they integrate RI/ESG issues in developed markets 
and 79 percent/84 percent for emerging markets (Q23). Signatories also report a high degree of 
integration in infrastructure assets (76 percent of asset owners and 62 percent of investment 
managers) where more established methodologies often draw from project finance standards 
relating to ESG. Notably, signatories report less progress in the area of fixed income assets 
where a higher degree of integration is reported for corporate issuers (59 percent of asset owners 
and 62 percent of investment managers) versus non-corporate issuers including sovereign debt. 
While signatories indicate the greatest progress towards integrating ESG issues in the area of 
listed equities, on the whole, signatories report integrating ESG issues across approximately 55 
percent of their asset allocation (including listed equities, fixed income, private equity, listed and 
non-listed real estate or property and infrastructure). 
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Also apparent from the 2009 Reporting and Assessment report is that although signatories to the 
PRI have grown significantly, within the context of capital market integration, total assets 
subject to integration by PRI signatories are still relatively small versus total market 
capitalisations (figure 4).   
 
Figure 4 – ESG integration by PRI signatories relative to total market size 
Shareholder engagement on ESG disclosure and collaborative engagement 
Critical to the development of responsible investment strategies are signatory/investee company 
relations that generate supply and demand pressures for disclosure of ESG information. In terms 
of what investors are asking companies from an ESG reporting and disclosure perspective, the 
Reporting and Assessment process asks whether signatories are requesting disclosures be made 
in their financial reports, have a stand-alone CSR report, or use the GRI reporting framework or 
Carbon Disclosure Project (Q62). Twenty-three percent of asset owners report having ‘asked 
investee companies to produce standardized reporting on their RI/ESG issue policies, practices 
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or performance’ to a large extent whereas 26 percent have not done so at all. Nine percent of 
asset owners ‘have provided feedback to investee companies on their reporting on RI/ESG 
issues’ to a large extent whereas 35 percent have not done so at all.  The distribution of responses 
indicates investors are not demanding the disclosure of ESG issues by investee companies in any 
one common form. This result suggests investors are more interested in accessing this 
information in whatever form possible, but also that mixed signals are coming from investors in 
their relationships with investee companies.  
Although signatory engagement policies that direct engagements most commonly include 
expectations of companies with regards to corporate governance issues (49.2 percent of asset 
owners and 36.2 percent of investment managers), a slightly smaller proportion of signatories 
also include expectations with regards to environmental issues (44.4 percent of asset owners and 
33.6 percent of investment managers (Q56).     
On questions surrounding investor policies and practices towards collaborative engagements, 30 
percent of asset owner signatories joined a collaborative engagement organized via the PRI 
Engagement Clearinghouse, an online portal for signatories. Additionally, the majority of 
signatories report participating in collaborative industry initiatives, with the most prominent 
initiative being the Carbon Disclosure Project, followed by the Institutional Investors Group on 
Climate Change (IIGCC) with a smaller proportion (approximately 23.8 percent) participating in 
the Ceres-led Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) (Q80). 
Internalizing responsible investment strategies 
Analyzing responses to Principle 4 (‘We will promote acceptance and implementation of the 
Principles within the investment industry’) is interesting as the questions analyze how signatories 
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are integrating responsible investment and requirements to consider ESG issues in their 
contractual relationships and incentive structures (Q67). A key issue discussed in the drafting of 
the Principles was that by being asset-owner driven, the PRI is meant to harness the power of 
asset owners in the investment supply chain. For those pension funds or investment advisors who 
use sub-advisors (external managers), approximately 30 percent of asset owners report including 
RI/ESG elements in contractual relations some of the time, whereas 37.5 percent of asset owners 
and 49.1 percent investment managers report no efforts taken in this regard.  
Looking at Principle 2 regarding engagement, asset owners are more likely to outsource their 
engagement activities either to their investment managers or to a third-party engagement overlay 
provider. This is an interesting response when considering which parties are actually involved in 
engaging with companies on environmental, social and governance issues as asset owners are 
less-likely to do it themselves. To the extent signatories are assessing the ESG engagement 
activities of their external investment managers, 12.3 percent of asset owners report doing so to a 
large extent and 40.4 percent to a moderate extent while 12.3 percent report taking no such 
action at all (Q54). Similar distributions are found with regards to the number of signatories 
considering the capabilities of external investment managers to engage with companies on ESG 
issues when searching for, selecting and retaining investment managers. 29.3 percent of asset 
owners reporting doing so for all of their external managers, while 24.1 percent reporting do so 
for less than half of their managers and 34.4 percent do not currently address these issues (Q55). 
Finally, apart from inclusion in contractual relationships, signatories also report on the extent to 
which they have internalized their responsible investment policies and practices in incentive 
structures for both internally and externally-managed investments. 73.3 percent of asset owners 
and 56.5 percent of investment managers report not including RI/ESG elements in incentive 
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structures for internally managed funds (Q67) (Figure 5). This figure grows to 87.7 percent of 
asset owners and 77.2 percent of investment managers when asked whether RI/ESG elements are 
included in externally-managed incentive structures (Q67) (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 5 – Inclusion of RI/ESG elements in internally-managed incentive structures 
 
Figure 6 – Inclusion of RI/ESG elements in externally-managed incentive structures 
In committing to the PRI, asset owners are meant to include RI/ESG issues in their contractual 
agreements and incentive structures thus providing market pressure or a commercial component 
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to get investors to adopt responsible investment practices. Results suggest, however, this has yet 
to materialize in a significant manner across the signatory base. 
Investor reporting on responsible investment activities 
With regards to investor reporting on responsible investment practices, Principle 6 assessment 
results indicate that 20 percent are publicly disclosing their Reporting and Assessment results. 
While the absolute numbers of signatories publicly disclosing has increased over time, in relative 
terms this proportion has declined. Perhaps most interesting, however, is the data concerning the 
use of RI performance metrics and what steps signatories have taken to measure the impact of 
responsible investment activities on their financial performance. Only 13 percent of asset owners 
have sought to determine what impact their RI/ESG issue related approach has had on the 
performance of their portfolio (Q91) to a large extent, whereas 38 percent have not done so at all. 
Furthermore, only 5 percent have sought (36 percent have not) to determine what impacts their 
RI/ESG issue related efforts, requests, and guidance have had on the consideration of RI/ESG 
issues by their external investment managers (Q92). 
Leaders and Laggards amongst PRI signatory base 
A clear trend in PRI implementation is visible within the Reporting and Assessment results. The 
PRI has been successful at attracting numerous asset owners to become signatories, yet not all 
signatories interpret their commitment and act on the principles in the same manner. It would 
appear that a significant minority of asset owners have fully internalized responsible investment 
strategies and rendered the strategies actionable (or taken steps towards such). The remaining 
majority of signatories have as of yet, not demonstrated progress to suggest they are acting on 
their commitments in a meaningful manner. This finding indicates differing levels of firm 
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adoption suggesting that institutional investors do not necessarily experience or perceive 
pressures from external institutions and stakeholders in the same manner.   
Furthermore, Reporting and Assessment survey results suggest a link between disclosure-based 
regulation and PRI adoption. A review of signatories finds that of the 44 countries represented by 
PRI signatories, nearly 67 percent of signatories are based in one of thirteen countries with 
current or expected regulations requiring disclosure of whether a fund has a policy which 
references responsible investment or ESG issues. These observations suggest that a large 
majority of PRI signatories are headquartered in countries with disclosure-based regulation. It 
suggests that the higher rate of adoption among these investors versus other regions illustrates 
how codes of conduct primarily function as tools for maintaining or enhancing corporate 
reputation in institutional environments where it is highlighted and/or threatened. Where these 
pressures are weaker or non-existent, the strategic motivations for adopting the PRI are reduced. 
The PRI has strongest market penetration in countries where disclosure-based regulation has 
raised the profile of responsible investment, however, this has not necessarily equated to better 
performance in the PRI Reporting and Assessment survey. For example, while U.K. signatories 
recorded higher scores then their peers from other regions, Australian scores for each Principle 
were lower (on-average) than any other developed country suggesting despite regulation, a 
significant proportion of signatories had not yet developed their implementation to the level 
observed on average amongst other regions.  
Leaders 
A review of Report and Assessment results suggests that a minority of signatories have taken 
action to internalize their commitment to the PRI, having reported a high degree of 
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implementation of responsible investment-related practices. This suggests that this minority 
appear to be motivated to join the PRI and publicly commit to adopting responsible investment 
practices as a function of their direct risk management strategies, demonstrating real progress via 
the Report and Assessment survey that suggests responsible investment is viewed as strategic 
components in ensuring long-term value creation and assuring stakeholders. Although difficult to 
confirm due to the limitations of the data set, some research has also shown that early adopters of 
new voluntary codes of conduct are typically those firms that already have the most advanced 
policies and procedures. Though speculative, this may indicate that the proactive institutional 
investors seek to reinforce their reputations through participation in the PRI.  
In addition to reputational benefits derived from affiliation with the UN-backed initiative, these 
funds are also motivated to adopt the PRI and participate in its networking activities as an 
opportunity to refine their investment strategies in a collaborative manner thereby reducing 
agency costs. The PRI, for these signatories, provides a framework for benchmarking assistance 
towards achieving their corporate strategy. While it is unclear to what extent other motivations 
influence their decision-making due to the aggregate nature of the data set, it appears that these 
investors have internalized the basic tenets of responsible investment - that ESG issues can be 
material and that consideration of these issues is consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities to 
beneficiaries. Their decision to publicly commit to the PRI and subsequently make the 
commitment actionable would suggest their motivation is more closely tied to direct economic 




For the broader majority of signatory responses, institutional investors have indicated a 
willingness to commit to the Principles but have not shown sufficient progress to suggest 
motivation is a function of their direct risk management strategies. These ‘underperforming’ 
signatories appear to interpret initial commitment as a primary means of assuring stakeholders 
that it operates responsibly and do not appear to interpret pressures as significant enough so as to 
warrant more meaningful action.   
Of this group of signatories, many indicate first steps taken towards implementing the principles, 
including the establishment of policies referencing responsible investment and ESG issues. As 
far as additional measures, however, results suggest these signatories have made fewer efforts to 
develop a strategy or plan of action for implementation. Most significantly, a broad majority of 
signatories have taken no steps towards including RI/ESG elements in contractual relationships 
or incentive structures and have demonstrated no action towards understanding the link between 
their responsible investment practices and the financial performance of their portfolios. 
Commitment therefore seems to be first and foremost about being perceived as a responsible 
asset owner or investment manager rather than fully internalizing responsible investment 
practices. This majority, then, appears to derive benefit from signing the PRI primarily in terms 
of brand/reputational benefits in essence free-riding off the efforts of the minority of signatories. 
This broader majority benefits from the PRI in terms of access to competitive information 
regarding responsible investment strategies of other signatories and a degree of social legitimacy 
provided by the UN-affiliated voluntary initiative.  
Just as investors have shown increasing concern about the reputational risks their investee 
companies face, the social license to operate has become an important element in the risk 
management practices of institutional investors. Pension funds and other institutional investors 
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appear to be sensitive to the broader trends and norms that define standards of behaviour. For the 
majority of signatories demonstrating little progress, attention to responsible investment and a 
commitment to the PRI appears to be firmly rooted in risk management strategies meant to 
preserve or enhance a scheme’s reputation. Most public institutional investors, being motivated 
by a search for social legitimacy, will incrementally adopt new strategies and change their 
behaviour to the point at which they attain sufficient legitimacy. Likewise, private institutional 
investors are motivated by these same pressures in addition to competitive concerns and a search 
for distinguishing characteristics to differentiate themselves. The PRI, with its connection to the 
UN, provides legitimacy while imposing relatively low costs to adopters. It would appear that 
many institutional investors have concluded that professing their commitment to responsible 
investment by committing to the PRI makes business sense. Unlike those who have demonstrated 
taking action to internalize their responsible investment strategy, business sense for this broader 
majority has primarily centred on reputational risk management.  
Summary 
The data on signatory implementation from the 2009 Reporting and Assessment survey suggest a 
large majority of PRI signatories have not taken steps to integrate ESG issues/implement PRI 
principles/commitments in several key areas. Although a large majority of investors have 
developed policies and high-level strategy for incorporating ESG issues into investment 
decision-making processes, very few have taken more extensive measures to operationalise their 
commitment in contractual obligations and incentive schemes. This suggests that a large portion 
of PRI signatories do not currently view responsible investment as a component of core business 
practices. The seemingly cursory attention paid by this large group ‘laggards’ supports the 
findings of Chapter 4 that participating in the PRI is primarily a means of addressing stakeholder 
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concerns rather than direct risk management practices. However, Reporting and Assessment 
results suggest we cannot fully generalize across all PRI signatories as there appear to be a small 
minority that report significant progress and efforts made to internalize their commitments 
related to the PRI in their internal processes.  
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Chapter 6 – The effectiveness of the Principles for Responsible Investment 
 
While the preceding chapters have focused on the strategic motivations of institutional investors 
to publicly commit to implementing the PRI principles and responsible investment practices, this 
chapter will reflect on whether the PRI, as a voluntary initiative, is likely to be effective at 
challenging investor behaviour and mainstreaming responsible investment. Although more 
speculative in nature given the short history of the initiative, the chapter draws on the broader 
literature on voluntary initiatives in general, focusing on the institutional design features that 
determine and impact its effectiveness. The following section provides a brief overview of 
common weaknesses of principles or codes-based voluntary initiatives before assessing the 
effectiveness of the PRI in greater detail.   
Identified strengths and weaknesses of voluntary initiatives 
Voluntary, self-regulation is said to provide greater flexibility with regards to adapting to new 
circumstances and their voluntary nature is said to provide greater potential in bringing more 
sceptical firms into the process of committing to certain standards. Due to the non-binding nature 
of these codes, the barriers for accession to the code may be lower for individual firms. Once a 
firm has become party to a code, proponents argue that there is potential for changes to corporate 
behaviour as a result of processes of social learning (Ruggie 2002). By providing a forum for the 
sharing and exchange of knowledge and ‘best practices,’ it is argued that voluntary initiatives 
can result in these practices becoming commonly accepted norms for a broader range of firms. 
Additionally, be committing to a voluntary code of conduct, firms subject themselves to peer 
pressure and greater scrutiny by stakeholders. Such external processes are argued to provide a 
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measure of accountability, such that codes may take on an important role in either supplementing 
or preceding public regulation (Haufler 2001).   
Critics of principle-based codes of conduct, however, identify several common weaknesses that 
can severely limit the effectiveness of voluntary measures. More sustained critiques have gone so 
far as to label voluntary initiatives as ‘greenwashing’ exercises, of a mainly symbolic character 
that are otherwise of little significance in improving the environmental and social performance of 
firms (Greer and Bruno 1997). Together, the weaknesses identified in several studies have 
important implications for the legitimacy and accountability of voluntary initiatives (Backstrand 
2005).   
Insufficient implementation measures and a lack of specific guidance on how individual 
commitments will be put into practice has shown to be a general weakness of voluntary measures 
across several industries and issue areas (Bondy, Matten and Moon 2004). Vague wording and a 
lack of guidance may provide for a broad range of interpretations, lessening the impact of efforts 
to standardize behaviour. Related to this, Clapp and Thistlewaite (forthcoming) argue a common 
feature of voluntary initiatives, and the GRI specifically, is the prioritisation of cost-saving 
measures over longer-term measures that address structural factors or indirect benefits. Finally, 
by focusing on process-related outcomes or the standardization of policies and procedures, critics 
argue that many voluntary initiatives do very little to target actual environmental performance 
(Backstrand 2005). Lacking performance-based benchmarks or thresholds as a component of 
participation, many voluntary measures permit firms to join without having shown any real effort 
beyond committing to continual improvement and refinement of processes and management 
systems. A concern for procedural aspects also complicates the task of assessing the performance 
of a voluntary initiative where no concrete environmental targets are provided.     
93 
 
The most common critique levelled against voluntary initiatives, however, are deficiencies in 
transparency, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that provide for weak accountability of 
participating institutions (Utting 2002; Clapp 2005). Importantly – given the relationship to the 
PRI and similar approach to enforcement and accountability mechanisms - these critiques have 
been levelled against the UN Global Compact. Drawing from the literature, a voluntary initiative 
is more likely to be effective when its design includes an auditing, disclosure and sanctioning 
component aimed at enforcing compliance with the standard (Prakash and Potoski 2006). When 
all are present, a voluntary initiative is more likely to curb shirking because together they provide 
a monitoring mechanism; provisions for increased transparency that can mitigate information 
asymmetries between participants and stakeholders; and, thirdly, create a mechanism for the 
sanctioning of non-compliant firms. Auld, Bernstein and Cashore (2008) found that when 
specific environmental standards, third-party oversight and sanctioning are absent, firm support 
does not tend to equate with on-the-ground changes in practices. Additionally, Prakash and 
Potosoki’s research (2006) suggests that policymakers and stakeholders should be sceptical of 
voluntary programs without any monitoring and enforcement rules as it can be expected that 
such programs will exhibit high levels of shirking and therefore be expected to generate very 
small positive externalities. 
Given the issued raised in a number of studies, previous methods of evaluating governance 
quality have been based largely upon input/output legitimacy (see Backstrand 2005). Input 
legitimacy refers to the participatory quality of the decision-making process and issues of 
transparency, representativeness and accountability. Output legitimacy relates to the problem-
solving capacities of the voluntary initiative and whether the mode of governance is effective. 
Importantly, although the two are interrelated, high output legitimacy in terms of effective 
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collective problem solving can compensate for low input legitimacy. Alternatively, a lack of 
output legitimacy often suggests the need for greater input legitimacy in terms of transparency 
and accountability processes.    
Institutional design and the effectiveness of the PRI 
The PRI has been very successful to-date in attracting institutional investors and fund managers 
to commit to implementing the principles in that in its current design, firms incur relatively low 
costs of adoption. Additionally, Reporting and Assessment results indicate the PRI Engagement 
Clearinghouse has been effective in generating greater support for signatory-led shareholder 
engagements. As an example, a PRI collaborative engagement pressuring companies to join the 
UN Global Compact resulted in approximately one hundred new firm commitments to the code 
of conduct. Additionally, a related engagement resulted in approximately 1/3 of non-responsive 
signatories fulfilling their reporting requirements in the Global Compact (PRI Report on Progress 
2009).  Relatively vague and aspirational language, however, which forms the basis of the PRI 
voluntary set of principles produce what Prakash and Potoski (2006) term a ‘lenient standard.’ 
Investors are able to adopt the principles, signalling to stakeholders their commitment to 
responsible investment while incurring low costs of adoption given the lacking performance 
standards and non-prescriptive ‘possible actions’ that allow signatories to selectively implement 
responsible investment practices. Signatories are able to benefit from affiliation with the 
initiative’s positive brand reputation and legitimacy provided by UN affiliation with no real 
requirements to alter their behaviour. From the perspective of attracting participants, this 
characteristic has been fundamental to the widespread adoption of the PRI. Importantly, 
however, this trait may prevent the PRI from providing clear guidance to institutional investors 
and limit the ability of the PRI to act as a meaningful governance mechanism to significantly 
95 
 
improve investor practices regarding the integration of corporate environmental and social 
performance into investment decision-making.  
The PRI appears, however, to have replicated in many ways existing regulation and its associated 
shortcomings. A noted shortcoming of disclosure-based state regulation is the lack of a clear and 
common definition of what constitutes ‘responsible’ investing or ESG integration. Indeed, it is 
rare that the term responsible investment be explicitly defined by those who have built product 
and service offerings around the concept in the financial services industry (Sethi 2005). While an 
objective of the PRI was to provide a global standard based on best practices from which 
responsible investment could be mainstreamed, the PRI has, to-date, not explicitly defined 
responsible investment, instead opting for the current framework which provides process-
oriented principles with no prescriptive or performance-based thresholds. The PRI, however, has 
been successful in legitimizing the term ESG and distinguishing its brand of responsible 
investment from the terms SRI or ethical investment which imply a subordination of financial 
returns in favour of ethical or broader stakeholder considerations. With such a large number of 
signatories, including some of the world’s largest pension funds and mainstream investment 
managers, the term ESG and concept of responsible investment has gained increasing cognitive 
legitimacy in mainstream finance (Hudson 2006). The term ‘ESG’ has been promoted – though 
vaguely defined – as an investment strategy which is directly related to long-term financial 
value. As written in the Principles themselves, the focus is on institutional investors behaving as 
more active owners through engagement rather than divestment and considering ESG issues - 
where ‘material’- in the investment decision-making process. Again, a shortcoming of this 
approach is that what constitutes both active ownership and ESG integration has not been 
explicitly defined and remains open to significant interpretation by signatories.     
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When compared to disclosure regulations in various jurisdictions, the PRI has, for the most part, 
replicated the shortcomings of these measures by not, as of yet, seeking to provide a standard 
definition and classification of responsible investment and ESG integration. Furthermore the 
Principles do not require particular behaviour from signatories or prescribe how pension funds 
and other institutional investors are to integrate environmental or social issues into their 
investments. Although the 35 ‘possible actions’ related to the six principles provide some 
guidance, the PRI Secretariat has emphasized that these actions are not necessarily required for 
all signatories. This has left signatories with a high degree of discretion in defining their 
investment approach as consistent with the PRI.  
A second noted shortcoming of disclosure-based state regulation is its failure to demand that 
investors report on which ethical or ESG criteria they include in their responsible investment 
policies and how these issues may be expected to affect the financial performance of the fund. 
Again, the PRI is limited in this regard, asking only for disclosure as to whether the investor has 
a policy or set of policies that make specific reference to responsible investment and if so, 
whether it covers environmental, social or governance issues. The PRI does not ask signatories to 
commit to reporting which ESG issues are included or what the methodology behind integration 
is. Among the list of conceivable actions for Principle 1 which addresses integration, there are no 
stated expectations that investors actually incorporate environmental or social factors into their 
ultimate portfolio construction (Richardson 2009).  
With regards to measuring the impact of the voluntary initiative and effectiveness of the PRI in 
radically challenging and reorienting investment practices, it is uncertain whether the PRI 
represents a viable governance mechanism to promote the institutionalisation of responsible 
investment. As the initiative was launched in 2006, it is unclear that the PRI has delivered any 
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measurable improvement in the mainstreaming of institutional investor activism on ESG issues 
beyond what would have occurred as a result of existing disclosure-based state regulations. This 
uncertainty is a direct result of weak accountability mechanisms which raise significant concerns 
regarding the extent to which the majority of signatories are implementing their commitments.  
Enforcement and accountability mechanisms 
As mentioned above, apart from considering the stringency of voluntary standards in 
determining their likely effectiveness, a key insight of the literature on the effectiveness of 
voluntary initiatives is that their efficacy can be undermined by free rider problems (Gibson 
1999). In turn, the effectiveness of the PRI, which represents an attempt at industry self-
regulation, is also contingent upon the nature of the monitoring and compliance mechanisms 
brought to bear on non-compliant firms. 
A major problem that voluntary initiatives face is that firms can commit to a voluntary code of 
conduct but fail to comply with – or show progress towards – its requirements. An indication of 
the problems the PRI faces in this regard are apparent in the experiences of one signatory, the 
United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF). A founding signatory to the PRI, with 
approximately US$28 billion in assets under management, UNJSPF currently allocates no capital 
to investment products termed ‘responsible’ or ‘sustainable.’ (Kiernan 2009) In the two years 
following signing and committing to the principles, the pension fund had not established a policy 
or set of policies that made specific reference to responsible investment or how specific 
environmental, social and governance issues were to be integrated into investment decision-
making and ownership practices (Principle 1). Nearly three years after signing, the fund finally 
began the process of establishing a policy on responsible investment and defining an 
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implementation strategy. Only in January 2010 was it reported that the UNJSPF was requesting a 
budget to hire a consultant to help implement a responsible investment program (after funding 
for a dedicated internal investment officer for responsible investment was rejected by the UN 
general assembly) (Responsible Investor 2010). A lingering problem, therefore, is that 
institutional investors like UNJSPF can become a signatory to the ‘aspirational’ principles 
without first demonstrating that they meet specific performance thresholds or progress 
benchmarks in subsequent years. The UNJSPF experience is a compelling example which 
illustrates the gap between rhetoric (becoming a signatory and publicly committing) and reality 
in ensuring that those who make a commitment are actually taking actions towards translating 
them into changes in investment practices. While a high-profile example given the UN-linkages, 
it is unlikely that this experience is unique to UNJSPF and it is reasonable to conclude based on 
Reporting and Assessment results that many other signatories have similar experiences.  
One outcome of the most recent (2009) PRI Reporting and Assessment process was the delisting 
of five signatories who failed to respond to the survey on their implementation of the Principles. 
Although the five signatories delisted are unlikely to make headlines given their small size, 
several critics who in the past had raised concerns with the PRI, noted it as a significant step 
forward in demonstrating that there are consequences to treating the PRI as nothing but a brand 
enhancer (Financial Times 2009). However, it is important to consider that those who were 
delisted for not having completed the survey cited that the survey was too time-consuming, 
finding it difficult to allocate the necessary resources to complete it (ibid.) This raises a concern 
regarding whether the Reporting and Assessment process is biased towards larger institutional 
investors given the internal resources required to complete the survey. For smaller foundations 
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and endowments with very small staff numbers, the completion of the survey may be too 
cumbersome, even though they may be proactively working to implement the principles.  
The Reporting and Assessment survey has been referenced as a measure to ensure the legitimacy 
and integrity of the PRI. However, the emphasis to-date has been to limit the burden and 
demands of the reporting process for signatories, to the detriment of it serving as an effective 
accountability mechanism.  As a result, signatories self-report and are not required to publicly 
disclose their results. The soft-approach of the initiative to reporting and monitoring has been – it 
is argued by the PRI Secretariat – to encourage the perception of a low barrier of entry with an 
emphasis on encouraging processes of collaboration and ‘best practice learning.’ This has 
resulted in a voluntary initiative with weak enforcement mechanisms and no provisions for third-
party auditing of signatory claims. For the PRI and other self-reporting initiatives that rely on the 
threat of reputational risk due to non-compliance, a lack of transparency prevents oversight by 
external parties from occurring and provides no enforcement mechanism or incentive for 
investors to take proactive measures. 
While the constitution forming the PRI has in place a provision for the removal of signatories if 
the signatory ‘fails over successive years to progress towards the commitments outlined in the 
Principles,’ as yet, this has not been tested and there remains no transparent rules on how such a 
progress threshold may be determined or monitored. A key philosophy of the initiative is that 
more significant pressures to adopt and conform to the set of principles will be driven by market 
forces and the reputational risks of non-compliance (PRI 2007). As indicated in the previous 
chapter, be being asset-owner driven, the PRI is meant to harness the power of pension funds and 
other institutional investors in the investment supply-chain, pressuring their fund managers and 
service providers to adopt consistent practices. However, PRI Reporting and Assessment results 
100 
 
indicate the majority of signatories are not including such requirements in their contractual 
relationships with third-parties or in incentive structures for internally and externally managed 
investments (PRI 2009). Another report has indicated that signatories pay little attention to the 
results of the survey or inquire as to efforts made by their service providers (Ethical Investor 
2009).  
The full impact of the market forces that the PRI is intended to harness have therefore been 
blunted by inaction and weak demand signals from asset owners. With regards to reputational 
risks signatories may face who are not complying, weak monitoring and a lack of transparency 
severely curtails the likelihood that signatories will face any reputational risks. As disclosure is 
not mandatory, the Reporting and Assessment process does not provide either clients and 
beneficiaries or external stakeholders with an opportunity to assess the actions taken by 
signatories. Because the PRI is designed to be voluntary and aspirational, it is limited in the tools 
it can resort to in challenging signatories to improve in these areas. 
As indicated in the preceding section, weak input legitimacy in the PRI institutional design raises 
significant concerns regarding the likely effectiveness or output legitimacy of the initiative. The 
extent to which the PRI leads to the desired outcome of increased investor activism regarding 
ESG issues is still difficult to assess. Historical data on signatory implementation over time is 
still unavailable given the short history of the PRI. However, this research has identified a 
number of potential weaknesses with regards to procedural elements including a lack of 
transparency and accountability that suggest adverse selection and free riding are strong 
possibilities in the absence of more substantive enforcement mechanisms. This suggests the need 
for increased scepticism regarding short-term claims of the effectiveness of the PRI initiative and 
the long-term viability of the voluntary and aspirational design.  
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Recent developments that suggest a possible ‘ratcheting up’ of PRI standards 
In a 2005 study, Utting points to the development of reforms that suggest an example of 
“ratcheting-up” of standards and a slight hardening of the soft volunteerism that characterized 
the early experiences of CSR, which centred on corporate self-regulation (Utting 2005). In light 
of these wider developments, it is important to consider the likelihood of the PRI reforming its 
current weak compliance procedures as the initiative evolves. Several recent developments 
suggest a gradual scaling-up of the PRI is more likely in the near term.  
The PRI Secretariat announced in July 2009 that it will consult with signatories on a mandatory 
transparency framework to become part of the Reporting and Assessment process. In announcing 
this decision, the PRI Executive Director stated that “signatories should be sufficiently 
transparent to ensure their clients, customers, members and other stakeholders have a clear sense 
of their responsible investment processes, activities and capabilities.” (Financial Times 2009) 
Such a move suggests recognition on the part of those governing the PRI that the initiative has 
very rapidly become a successful brand image and that as discussed above, current measures 
may be unsuitable to protect the integrity and legitimacy of the initiative going forward. 
Although it is unclear what is precisely motivating this decision to move towards greater 
transparency, several factors may be influential.  
A possible explanation is that this move could be a response to external stakeholder pressures – 
most notably from NGOs - for improved transparency of signatory results. Yet, to-date, there is 
limited evidence of a concerted effort by NGOs or other stakeholders to push for such action.  
One example surrounds Crédit Agricole, France’s largest bank and its advertising campaign 
identifying it as ‘the Green Bank.’ (Crédit Agricole 2010) Friends of the Earth called the 
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marketing push “the worse example of greenwash it had ever seen.” In response, FOE publicized 
a dossier on the bank’s activities in the fossil-fuel and defence industries and submitted it to the 
advertising standards board. Similarly, reports by BankTrack have argued that climate change 
and other environmental issues have influenced banks’ investment decisions only marginally, 
finding that banks with green reputations including Crédit Agricole, Standard Chartered of the 
U.K. and HSBC consistently finance environmentally destructive projects (BankTrack 2010). In 
response, to FOE, Crédit Agricole said the advertising campaign was “not simply an 
environmental notion” but was meant to highlight a broader change in the bank’s approach to 
business, focusing on more responsible and ethical practices, pointing out that it was a signatory 
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment and member of SRI index, FTSE4Good. This 
example illustrates how financial institutions and PRI signatories do face some scrutiny when 
advertising their green credentials. Still, there are limited cases both of NGOs scrutinizing the 
PRI as an initiative and more concerted campaigning from NGOs as in the case of BankTrack 
and the Equator Principles, or Corpwatch and the UN Global Compact.   
Another possible explanation is that the PRI Secretariat and its governing board are responding 
to internal stakeholder pressures from signatories and the mainstream financial press. Several 
publicised comments from signatories would suggest dissatisfaction with the current lack of 
transparency regarding implementation by other signatories. In the 2008 Report on Progress, the 
PRI Secretariat recognized that some signatories have expressed a concern that other reporting 
signatories were over-estimating their degree of implementation and execution (PRI 2008). An 
article by the Financial Times in July 2009, titled “UN Principles need sharper teeth” also 
concluded that under the current design, the initiative did not provide adequate transparency 
from which investor behaviour could be scrutinized. Such deficiencies, it was argued, meant 
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some signatories lay themselves open to the charges of ‘greenwashing’ – the act of misleading 
consumers and stakeholders regarding the environmental practices of a company or the 
environmental benefits of a product or service. The CEO of VicSuper, a founding signatory, 
echoed these criticisms stated that “[he was] excited that a lot of funds have signed up to the 
UNPRI, but [he] think[s] the level of integration of these issues is probably pretty superficial.” 
(Ethical Investor 2009) These comments were confirmed in an independent study of Australian 
PRI signatories by Mercer Investment Consulting which concluded that currently only about one 
in ten Australian equity managers achieved an ESG rating of a “good standard,” while 56 percent 
were ranked as “less than adequate.” (Mercer 2009) In their report, Mercer assessed the 
investment managers’ ability to integrate ESG factors into the investment process based on the 
competences and skills of team members, their access to and use of appropriate data for 
evaluation of ESG risks and opportunities, and the extent to which these metrics are embedded 
into the generation of the performance over and above a benchmark index.  
Such comments suggest increasing scrutiny of the currently weak monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms from signatories themselves. The Chair of the PRI, Donald MacDonald reported in 
an interview that responding to suggestions by a small number of signatories, the PRI was 
exploring the possibility of allowing signatories on a voluntary basis – whether asset owners or 
investment managers – to seek third-party verification of their assessment results (EvoTV 2009). 
Those suggesting such measures are likely those who are genuinely motivated to implement the 
Principles and who view signatory status in the PRI as a means of differentiating themselves 
from their competition. From a reputational point of view, firms that are genuinely trying to 
integrate ESG issues into the fund management process may see it in their interest to submit 
themselves to a more detailed and rigorous process. Similarly, pension funds – whether public or 
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private – may be motivated to be more transparent and publicize third-party audited results as a 
means of increasing confidence in their process and fund offerings.   
Conclusion  
A review of the current institutional design of the PRI and its monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms highlights significant gaps in accountability and legitimacy.  This puts a significant 
damper on the likely effectiveness of the Principles serving to challenge investor behaviour. In 
sum, these problems add up to a lack of incentive for firms to go much beyond “business as 
usual” as signatory institutions are able to benefit from affiliation with the PRI brand and a UN 
connection, while facing very little pressure to demonstrate implementation and progress.  
The consequences of this are twofold and interrelated. First, limited transparency and no real 
requirements that investors demonstrate they meet performance thresholds may risk legitimizing 
merely a slight variant of the status quo.  This would blunt the potential impact of the PRI in 
serving as a vehicle to improve corporate performance on ESG issues and better aligning 
investment activities with the broader interests of society. Second, as Prakash and Potoski’s 
(2006) findings indicate, the reputational benefit derived by participants in a voluntary initiative 
is linked – over the long-term – to the perceived effectiveness of the initiative. In short, the 
design of the initiative is the primary driver of branding benefits. As the literature notes, less 
stringent voluntary standards are likely to threaten the credibility of the initiative’s brand over 
the longer-term. A voluntary initiative with a reputation for shirking as well as ineffective 
policing and sanctioning mechanisms is likely to suffer from problems of adverse selection and 
free riding. Therefore, in the future, the PRI could provide limited reputational benefits to 
participating institutions if a majority of signatories are shown to be making little effort at 
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integrating the principles into their core activities. In turn, this may deter proactive signatories - 
or potential signatories and those primarily motivated by the reputational benefits - from 
continuing to participate, seeking to distance themselves from an initiative viewed as non-
credible or illegitimate. Such developments would further reinforce the concerns that the PRI’s 







Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
A dominant assumption of recent empirical work on firm participation in voluntary initiatives 
has been that the decision and selection of corporate environmental practices is the result of 
utilitarian cost-benefit logic emphasizing a market rationale (the business case) of CSR and 
participation in voluntary initiatives. Contrary to this literature, however, the findings of this 
research indicate that cost-benefit explanations are not wholly persuasive in understanding why 
institutional investors have adopted responsible investment practices and decided to participate 
and publicly commit to the PRI.  
As argued in this thesis, institutional investor decisions to integrate ESG issues and adopt 
responsible investment practices are significantly influenced by formal pressures by external 
institutions. Principally, stakeholder and regulatory influences have established normative 
standards directed towards the conduct of investors. Public opinion has evolved – the result of 
NGO capital market campaigning and advocacy efforts - to put greater emphasis on sustainable 
development. In turn, the image and reputation of a pension scheme in relation to these trends 
have come under increasing pressure such that being perceived as a ‘responsible’ investor has 
become a central strategic motivation of institutional investors. The centrality of reputational 
risks to understanding the emergence of responsible investment is confirmed in several industry 
surveys. The predominant response is that the most important consideration for schemes in 
involving environmental and social factors in the investment process is the connection with 
corporate governance policies and the belief that attention for responsible investment enhances a 
scheme’s reputation.  
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Although not mandating the inclusion of ESG issues in investment decision-making by 
institutional investors, disclosure-based legislation has raised the profile of institutional investor 
behaviour. Surveys of institutional investors suggest firms are motivated to adopt responsible 
investment and participate in the PRI as form of preventative action, seeking to avoid additional 
or more intrusive regulation in the future by engaging proactively in an effort to influence the 
evolution of regulatory trends. 
Significantly, these findings support complex market rationalism explanations that suggest firm 
participation should principally be seen as a response to pressures and demands from external 
stakeholders to conform to changing expectations of what is considered legitimate, appropriate 
or ‘responsible’ investor behaviour. As such, the decision to adopt the PRI and establish 
commitments to adopting investment decision-making processes and ownership practices 
deemed ‘responsible’ should principally be seen as embedded in broader reputational risk 
management strategies, grounded in a variety of strategic motivations to assure stakeholders that 
their concerns are being internalized into corporate practices. These findings also support the 
conclusions of Wright and Rwabizambuga (2006) in their analysis of project finance banks’ 
participation in the Equator Principles.  
Interestingly, the number of financial institutions adopting the PRI increased during the global 
financial crisis (2008-2009) reinforcing the view that investors perceive the PRI as an attractive 
source of legitimacy and branding benefits. In response to public outrage over failures in 
corporate governance and accountability, financial institutions have sought to assure immediate 
beneficiaries as broader stakeholders that they have adequate risk management practices in place. 
With its association with the UN and industry ‘best practice,’ the PRI serves as a sort of signpost 
for good governance while presenting low adoption costs to the investor.  
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The discussion of results and the conclusions from this study need to be considered in the context 
of several important limitations. As the research is exploratory and descriptive in nature, the 
focus is general in nature, seeking to identify the broad motivations underpinning the growth of 
responsible investment among institutional investors and the decision to publicly commit to the 
PRI. Related studies on firm participation in voluntary initiatives indicate that a firm’s overall 
reputation reflects its ability to respond to the demand of multiple stakeholders with different 
normative perspectives, interests and objectives (Wright and Rwambizambuga 2006). As such, 
the institutional environment of a particular firm varies, suggesting that external institutional 
pressures from stakeholders or regulators can vary in the extent to which they challenge a firm’s 
overall reputational status. These variations in institutional environments produce different 
strategic incentives for firms to adopt voluntary codes of conduct. For example, studies have 
indicated that a firm closely monitored by an NGO may face greater reputational risks than firms 
facing less scrutiny. Future research must therefore adopt a firm-centred approach as well as 
addressing how regional patterns in adoption rates reflect variations in the institutional 
environment of institutional investors. In particular, what differences may explain a similar firm, 
operating in a similar environment as a PRI signatory, opting to not become signatory to the 
principles? The research undertaken for this thesis has indicated that participation in the PRI 
largely depends on the reputational benefits flowing from such actions. If more detailed data on 
the PRI signatory base was made available, future research could analyze how the perceived 
level of threat to corporate reputation is shaped by the institutional environment of the financial 
institution. Future research may also identify why firms who have otherwise already adopted 
beyond-compliance measures choose not to participate in voluntary initiatives. Such empirical 
work may hold important insights for regulators and stakeholders seeking more effective 
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strategies for leveraging the power of institutional investors in promoting improved corporate 
environmental practices.  
The secondary research question has explored the adequacy of the PRI to serve as an effective 
governance mechanism to institutionalise responsible investment practices. Although the results 
are more speculative in nature, these findings indicate that while some progress has been shown, 
it remains unclear as to whether the PRI has generated significant improvement in the majority 
of signatories related to the integration of ESG issues into decision-making. In particular, it is 
difficult to assess whether the PRI has delivered any measurable improvement in investor 
activism on ESG issues beyond what would have occurred anyways or as a result of the existing 
patchwork of disclosure-based state regulations which exist in numerous OECD countries. 
Rather, the PRI appears in many ways to mirror existing disclosure regulation, in many ways 
accommodating rather than radically challenging the status quo via prescriptive or substantive 
performance requirements. Vague language which forms the basis of the voluntary and 
aspirational code of conduct and a lack of enforcement mechanisms prevents the PRI from 
serving as a meaningful mechanism to significantly improve investor practices concerning the 
integration of corporate environmental performance in investment decision-making.  
A reliance on voluntary and aspirational principles with no real requirements that investors 
demonstrate they meet performance thresholds may risk, over the longer-term, legitimizing 
merely a slight variant of the status quo, blunting the full intended impact of responsible 
investment and the promotion of improved corporate performance on ESG issues. As argued, 
this has two consequences. First, a lack of accountability measures limits the likely effectiveness 
of the PRI in realising its stated goal of better aligning investment activities with the broader 
interests of society. Second, as the literature notes, less stringent voluntary standards are likely to 
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threaten the credibility of the initiative’s reputation over the longer-term. A voluntary initiative 
with a reputation for shirking as well as ineffective policing and sanctioning mechanisms is 
likely to suffer from problems of adverse selection and free riding. Significantly, a failure to 
reform the institutional design may result in the initiative providing limited reputational benefits 
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Full text of The Principles for Responsible Investment 
The Principles for Responsible Investment 
As institutional investors, we have a duty to act in the best long-term interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary 
role, we believe that environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can affect the performance of 
investment portfolios (to varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions, asset classes and through time). We 
also recognise that applying these Principles may better align investors with broader objectives of society. 
Therefore, where consistent with our fiduciary responsibilities, we commit to the following: 
1 We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
Possible actions: 
 
Address ESG issues in investment policy statements 
Support development of ESG-related tools, metrics, and analyses 
Assess the capabilities of internal investment managers to incorporate ESG issues 
Assess the capabilities of external investment managers to incorporate ESG issues 
Ask investment service providers (such as financial analysts, consultants, brokers, research firms, or rating 
companies) to integrate ESG factors into evolving research and analysis 
Encourage academic and other research on this theme 
Advocate ESG training for investment professionals 
2 We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. 
Possible actions: 
Develop and disclose an active ownership policy consistent with the Principles 
Exercise voting rights or monitor compliance with voting policy (if outsourced) 
Develop an engagement capability (either directly or through outsourcing) 
Participate in the development of policy, regulation, and standard setting (such as promoting and protecting 
shareholder rights) 
File shareholder resolutions consistent with long-term ESG considerations 
Engage with companies on ESG issues 
Participate in collaborative engagement initiatives 
Ask investment managers to undertake and report on ESG-related engagement 
3 We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
Possible actions: 
Ask for standardised reporting on ESG issues (using tools such as the Global Reporting Initiative) 
Ask for ESG issues to be integrated within annual financial reports 
Ask for information from companies regarding adoption of/adherence to relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct 
or international initiatives (such as the UN Global Compact) 
Support shareholder initiatives and resolutions promoting ESG disclosure 
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4 We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry. 
Possible actions: 
Include Principles-related requirements in requests for proposals (RFPs) 
Align investment mandates, monitoring procedures, performance indicators and incentive structures accordingly (for 
example, ensure investment management processes reflect long-term time horizons when appropriate) 
Communicate ESG expectations to investment service providers 
Revisit relationships with service providers that fail to meet ESG expectations 
Support the development of tools for benchmarking ESG integration 
Support regulatory or policy developments that enable implementation of the Principles 
5 We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
Possible actions: 
Support/participate in networks and information platforms to share tools, pool resources, and make use of investor 
reporting as a source of learning 
Collectively address relevant emerging issues 
Develop or support appropriate collaborative initiatives 
6 We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles. 
Possible actions: 
Disclose how ESG issues are integrated within investment practices 
Disclose active ownership activities (voting, engagement, and/or policy dialogue) 
Disclose what is required from service providers in relation to the Principles 
Communicate with beneficiaries about ESG issues and the Principles 
Report on progress and/or achievements relating to the Principles using a 'Comply or Explain'* approach 
Seek to determine the impact of the Principles 
Make use of reporting to raise awareness among a broader group of stakeholders 
*The Comply or Explain approach requires signatories to report on how they implement the Principles, or provide 
an explanation where they do not comply with them. 
The Principles for Responsible Investment were developed by an international group of institutional investors 
reflecting the increasing relevance of environmental, social and corporate governance issues to investment practices. 
The process was convened by the United Nations Secretary-General. 
In signing the Principles, we as investors publicly commit to adopt and implement them, where consistent with our 
fiduciary responsibilities. We also commit to evaluate the effectiveness and improve the content of the Principles 
over time. We believe this will improve our ability to meet commitments to beneficiaries as well as better align our 
investment activities with the broader interests of society. 
We encourage other investors to adopt the Principles. 
 
 
